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Summary
Despite apparently consistent statements in over three decades, the “one China”
policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different
interpretations.  Apart from questions about what the “one China” policy entails, issues
have arisen about whether U.S. presidents have stated clear positions and have changed
or should change policy, affecting U.S. vital interests in peace and stability.  In Part I,
this CRS Report discusses the “one China” policy since the United States began in 1971
to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government.  Part
II documents the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and articulated in key
statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.  This report will be updated.
U.S. policy on “one China” has evolved to cover three major issue areas:
sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue.  First, the United States did not
explicitly state its own position on the status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint
Communiques, but “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the strait.
President Bush has stated “non-support” for Taiwan independence, but questions have
arisen since October 2002 about whether he changed his position to one of “opposition”
in closed meetings with the PRC president.  Second, successive Administrations have
shown opposition to a PRC use of force to resolve the Taiwan question.  President
Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers near Taiwan in 1996, and President Bush in 2001
initially said he would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.”  Third,
President Reagan gave “Six Assurances” to Taiwan in 1982, including one that
Washington would not pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing.  With intermittent talks
and military tensions in the 1990s, President Clinton urged cross-strait dialogue.  The
Bush Administration has re-emphasized the “Six Assurances.”  Both Beijing and Taipei
have shifted to call for a more active U.S. role in encouraging cross-strait dialogue.
Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in preventing conflict across the Taiwan Strait
have been challenged increasingly by the PRC’s military modernization and moves by
Taiwan perceived in Beijing as provocations that would consolidate an independent
status.  On August 3, 2002, the President of the Republic of China (ROC), commonly
called Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), gave a
speech on “one country on each side” of the strait, surprising Washington.  Leading up
to his re-election on March 20, 2004, Chen called for referendums and a new
constitution by 2008.  PRC Premier Wen Jiabao warned on November 22, 2003, that
China would “pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland.”  Appearing next
to visiting Premier Wen on December 9, 2003, President Bush stated opposition to
Chen’s efforts to change the status quo, indicating concerns about a future military
crisis.  Critics charged that Bush sided with Beijing’s belligerence.   The Administration
has stated opposition to unilateral changes from Beijing or Taipei to the “status quo.”
Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, and the
President’s management of the Taiwan Strait situation to advance U.S. strategic interests
in democracy, peace and stability, and economic growth.  A review of policy toward
Taiwan could involve a Congressional role.  On U.S. arms sales to and defense relations
with Taiwan, see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,
by Shirley Kan.  On current legislation, see CRS Report RL33510, Taiwan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
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1 Department of State, Press Briefing by James Rubin, July 15, 1999; Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright’s remarks on visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, July 20, 1999.
China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China”
Policy — Key Statements from Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei
Part I:  U.S. Policy on “One China”
Congressional Concerns
Paying particular attention to congressional influence on policy, this CRS
Report discusses the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan since the United
States (under the Nixon Administration) began in 1971 to reach understandings with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government, which has insisted on its “one
China” principle.  This report also reviews comprehensively the evolution of the “one
China” issue, as it has been articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and
Taipei.  (On U.S. arms sales to and defense relations with Taiwan, see CRS Report
RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley Kan.  On current
legislation, see CRS Report RL33510, Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy
Choices, by Kerry Dumbaugh.)
In the 1990s, Congress pushed for changes in policy toward Taiwan.  Questions
about the “one China” policy arose again after Lee Teng-hui, then-President of
Taiwan (formally called the Republic of China (ROC)), characterized cross-strait
relations as “special state-to-state ties” on July 9, 1999.  Beijing responded
vehemently with calls for Lee to retract the perceived deviation from the “one China”
policy and reiterated longstanding threats to use force if necessary to prevent a
declaration of independence by Taiwan.  The PRC also questioned U.S. commitment
to “one China” and expressed opposition to any U.S. military intervention.  The
Clinton Administration responded that Lee’s statement was not helpful and
reaffirmed the “one China” policy.1  Some questioned whether U.S. law, the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, requires U.S. defense of Taiwan against an attack
from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military.  Congress paid greater
attention to arms sales to Taiwan.
Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, at a July
21, 1999 hearing, said that Lee “created an opportunity to break free from the
anachronistic, Beijing-inspired one-China policy which has imprisoned U.S. policy
toward China and Taiwan for years.”  Representative Benjamin Gilman, Chairman
of the International Relations Committee, wrote in a September 7, 1999 letter to
Clinton that it is a “common misperception” that we conceded officially that Beijing
CRS-2
2 Dalrymple, Mary, “Taiwanese President’s Comment Inspires GOP to Renew Attack on
Clinton’s ‘One China’ Policy,” Congressional Quarterly, July 24, 1999; Letter from
Representative Benjamin Gilman to President Clinton, September 7, 1999.
3 Richard Lugar, “Timely Exit for Ambiguity,” Washington Times, May 17, 2001.
4 Henry Hyde, “Remarks at Tsinghua University,” Beijing, December 10, 2002.
is the capital of the “one China” that includes Taiwan.  He wrote, “under no
circumstances should the United States move toward Beijing’s version of ‘one
China’.”2
Cabinet-Level Visits to Taiwan After 1979
1992 U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills
1994 Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena
1996 Small Business Administrator Phil Lader
1998 Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson
2000 Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater
Source:  U.S.-Taiwan Business Council.
Since 2001, U.S. policymakers have tended to stress continuity.  During the
George W. Bush Administration, leaders of the House and Senate have stressed
support for Taiwan as a democracy, rather than its status as independent from China.
Moreover, Members have expressed concerns about cross-strait tensions arising from
actions taken not only by Beijing but by Taipei as well.  Congress has tended to stress
continuity in maintaining the “one China” policy.
Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote
in May 2001 that “for many years, successive U.S. administrations have affirmed that
there is one China and that the people on Taiwan and the people of China should
work out a plan for peaceful unification.”  He also referred to a debate on the nature
of the U.S. obligation to “defend democracy in Taiwan” and to prevent a “forceful
military unification of Taiwan and China.”3  Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman
of the International Relations Committee, spoke in Beijing in December 2002 and
dismissed notions that U.S. support for Taiwan is geared toward containing or
dividing China.  He said that “the bedrock of the very strong support for Taiwan in
the U.S. Congress” is the shared experience as democracies.  Moreover, Hyde
highlighted Taiwan’s significance as a model of a “Chinese democracy” that proved
democracy is compatible with Chinese culture.4
As a focal point in the House for diverse interests regarding Taiwan, an initial
number of 85 Members formed a bipartisan Taiwan Caucus on April 9, 2002, with
Representatives Robert Wexler, Steve Chabot, Sherrod Brown, and Dana
Rohrabacher as co-chairs.  Later, 10 Senators were original members of another
Taiwan Caucus formed on September 17, 2003, with Senators George Allen and Tim
Johnson as co-chairs.  At two events at the Heritage Foundation in 2003 and 2004,
CRS-3
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Symposium on “Rethinking ‘One China’,” Heritage Foundation, February 26, 2004.
6 “Taiwan Office’s Wang Zaixi: Taiwan Independence Means War, Use of Force is Difficult
to Avoid,” Xinhua and China Daily, November 18, 2003.
7 Richard Armitage, press availability, Exhibit Hall, Washington, DC, November 18, 2003.
8 Interview with the Washington Post, published November 23, 2003.
9 Sherrod Brown, Steve Chabot, Dana Rohrabacher, and Robert Wexler, “Congressional
Taiwan Caucus Urges President Bush to Reconsider Position on Taiwanese Referendum,”
December 11, 2003.
Representatives Robert Andrews and Steve Chabot spoke critically of the “one
China” policy.5
Congressional views have been shaped by developments in Taiwan and concern
about cross-strait tensions.  On August 3, 2002, President Chen Shui-bian of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gave a speech using the phrase “one country on
each side” of the strait, surprising Washington.  Leading up to the presidential
election on March 20, 2004, Chen advocated holding the first referendums (on the
same day as the election) and drafting a new constitution with a timetable (a new
draft constitution by September 28, 2006; a referendum on the constitution on
December 10, 2006; and enactment of the new constitution on May 20, 2008).
On November 18, 2003, a PRC official on Taiwan affairs who is a PLA major
general issued a threat to use force against what Beijing perceives as the “open
promotion of Taiwan independence.”6  Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
responded by saying that “there’s an election and campaign going on in Taiwan, and
I think one shouldn’t over-emphasize comments that are made in the heat of an
election” and that the United States “has full faith that the question of Taiwan will
be resolved peacefully.”  He added that the TRA guides policy in providing Taiwan
“sufficient defense articles for her self-defense” and “also requires the United States
to keep sufficient force in the Asia Pacific area to be able to keep the area calm.”
Armitage reaffirmed that the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense, with
no defense treaty, “doesn’t go beyond that in the Taiwan Relations Act, and we have
good, competent military forces there.”7  
On the eve of his visit to Washington, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao warned on
November 22, 2003, that China would “pay any price to safeguard the unity of the
motherland.”8  On November 29, President Chen surprisingly announced that he
would use one provision in the referendum law passed by the opposition-dominated
legislature two days earlier and hold a “defensive referendum” on China’s threats on
the day of the presidential election.  During his meeting with Premier Wen in the
Oval Office on December 9, 2003, President Bush stated that he opposed Chen’s
efforts to change the status quo, drawing criticisms that Bush sided with the PRC’s
belligerence.  The four co-chairmen of the Taiwan Caucus in the House wrote a letter
to President Bush, criticizing his stance as a victory for the authoritarian regime of
the PRC at the expense of Taiwan’s democratic reforms.9  
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10 House International Relations Committee, hearing, “The Taiwan Relations Act: the Next
25 Years,” April 21, 2004. 
11 The vote was 400 yeas, 18 nays, 4 present, and 11 not-voting.
12 Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the FY 2007 Defense Department Budget,
March 7, 2006.
After congratulating Chen Shui-bian on his re-election in March 2004, the
Administration, in testimony on April 21, 2004, further clarified U.S. policy toward
Taiwan and warned of “limitations” in U.S. support for constitutional changes in
Taiwan.  At that hearing on the TRA, Representative James Leach, Chairman of the
House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, stated that
Taiwan has the unique situation in which it can have de facto self-determination only
if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty.  He urged Taiwan’s
people to recognize that they have greater security in “political ambiguity.”  He called
for continuity, saying that “together with our historic ‘one China’ policy,” the TRA
has contributed to ensuring peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.10  In his inaugural
address on May 20, Chen responded to U.S. concerns, excluding sovereignty issues
and a referendum from his continued plan for a new constitution by 2008.  Leach
represented the United States at Chen’s second inauguration, and at a subcommittee
hearing on June 2, 2004, Leach praised Chen’s words as “thoughtful, statesmanlike,
and helpful” as well as “constructive” for dialogue with Beijing.  To mark the 25th
anniversary of the TRA on April 10, 2004, the House voted on July 15, 2004, to pass
H.Con.Res. 462 (Hyde) to reaffirm “unwavering commitment” to the TRA.11
Congressional concerns remain about challenges to U.S. interests in reducing
tensions and fostering dialogue across the Taiwan Strait.  In March 2005, China
adopted an “Anti-Secession Law.”  Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian announced on
February 27, 2006, that he would “terminate” the National Unification Council and
Guidelines.  Senator John Warner, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, told
Admiral William Fallon, Commander of the Pacific Command, at a committee
hearing on March 7, 2006, that “if conflict were precipitated by just inappropriate and
wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese elected officials, I’m not entirely sure
that this nation would come full force to their rescue if they created that problem.”12
In sum, Congress has exercised important roles in legislating and overseeing the
TRA of 1979, as Congress and the President have recalibrated the  U.S. “one China”
policy over the decades.  U.S. national security interests in a peaceful resolution of
the Taiwan question have been increasingly challenged by the PRC’s military
modernization and Taiwan’s moves perceived in Beijing as provocatively
formalizing and legitimizing an independent status.  Since 2000, increasing political
polarization and volatility in Taiwan have raised the importance of U.S. policy
toward Taiwan for fostering U.S. interests there.  These interests include sustainable
peace and security for the people of Taiwan and the rest of Asia, Taiwan’s
democracy, and economic ties with a major trading partner.  At the same time, the
dominance of domestic politics in Taiwan has reduced U.S. leverage, except that
U.S. actions and words can impact those internal politics.
CRS-5
13 Some observers say that the U.S. position on “one China” dates back more than three
decades. (See Henry Kissinger, “Storm Clouds Gathering,” Washington Post, September 7,
1999.)  In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, marked “Retrocession Day,” when
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Key Statements and Ambiguity
Five key documents stand out among U.S. policy statements on Taiwan:
! Shanghai Communique of 1972
! Normalization Communique of 1979
! Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (P.L. 96-8) of 1979
! Six Assurances to Taipei of 1982
! August 17 Communique (on arms sales) of 1982.  
(See excerpts of these and other statements in Part II of this CRS Report.)
Despite apparently consistent formal statements and closed-door assurances in
over three decades,13 the “one China” question has been left somewhat ambiguous
and subject to different interpretations among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.  The
idea of “one China” has been complicated by the co-existence of the PRC
government ruling the mainland and the ROC government on Taiwan since 1949.
The political and strategic context of those key statements has also experienced
significant change.  Since political reforms began in 1986, Taiwan became a
democracy, with a new basis for the government’s legitimacy and greater say by
proponents of a separate Taiwan identity.  The Tiananmen crackdown of 1989 in the
PRC dramatically proved the limits to liberal change on the mainland.  The original
strategic rationale for U.S.-PRC rapprochement faded with the end of the Cold War.
In May 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s Chen Shui-bian became
President of the ROC, ousting the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), as the
ruling party in Taiwan for the first time in 55 years. 
There are several complicating issues about the language in the key statements.
First, “China”  was not defined in the three joint communiques.  In the Normalization
Communique, the United States recognized the PRC government as the sole legal
government of China, but the PRC has never ruled Taiwan and other islands under
the control of the ROC government.  The PRC’s late paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping’s 1984 proposal of “one China, two systems” sought to define Taiwan as
a Special Administrative Region under the PRC after unification.  On the other hand,
“Taiwan” was defined in Sec. 15(2) of the TRA essentially to be the islands of
Taiwan and the Pescadores, plus the people, entities, and governing authorities there.
Second, there has been disagreement as to whether Taiwan’s status actually was
resolved or determined.  In secret talks in 1972, President Nixon assured PRC
Premier Zhou Enlai that the United States viewed the status of Taiwan as
“determined” to be part of one China.  The PRC’s December 1978 statement on
normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States said that the Taiwan
question “has now been resolved between the two countries.”  However, the U.S.
statement of December 1978 on normalization stated the expectation that the Taiwan
question “will be settled” peacefully by the Chinese themselves.  The TRA also
CRS-6
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15 In the 106th Congress, the House International Relations Committee debated this issue of
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stipulated the U.S. expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by
peaceful means.  President Reagan’s 1982 statement on arms sales to Taiwan
declared that “the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides
of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.”  Moreover, “settlement” or “resolution” — not
stated as “unification” or “reunification” — of the Taiwan question is left open to be
peacefully determined by both sides.
Third, the issues of the PRC’s possible use of force, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan,
and possible U.S. help in Taiwan’s self-defense were left contentious and critical for
U.S. interests.  Washington has consistently stated its strong interest that there be a
peaceful settlement, but the PRC has not renounced its claimed sovereign right to use
force if necessary.  Washington has not promised to end arms sales to Taiwan,
although the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 was terminated on December 31, 1979.14
In the surprise announcements of December 1978 on establishing diplomatic
relations, the United States stated its interest in a peaceful resolution, but the PRC
countered that Taiwan is China’s internal affair.  President Reagan agreed to the 1982
Communique on reducing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan — premised on the PRC’s
declared policy of peaceful unification.  In the early 1990s, the PLA began to build
up its theater missile force and to acquire modern arms, especially from Moscow.
The 1979 TRA states that the United States will provide necessary defense
articles and services to Taiwan for its sufficient self-defense, and will consider with
“grave concern” any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future.  In deciding
on that language in 1979, Members of Congress debated whether the wording on
U.S. military intentions was clear or ambiguous.  Since the mid-1990s, a new debate
has arisen over how to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait, including whether
ambiguity or clarity in U.S. statements about a possible military role serves U.S.
interests in preventing conflict or provocations from either Beijing or Taipei.15  There
have been issues about whether and how U.S. statements of intentions might be
clarified to specify the conditions under which the U.S. military would help to defend
Taiwan and the U.S. stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty or efforts to change its declared
political status.16  Questions also have persisted about the extent of the U.S. defense
commitment to Taiwan, given President Clinton’s 1996 deployment of two aircraft
carriers near Taiwan and President Bush’s initial statement in 2001 of doing
“whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.”
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Has U.S. Policy Changed?
Apart from questions about the language in the key statements on “one China,”
policy questions have arisen about whether successive Administrations have changed
the U.S. position since 1971 to adapt to changing circumstances and whether such
shifts have advanced U.S. interests.  Successive Administrations have generally
maintained that “long-standing” U.S. policy has been consistent.  Some in Congress
and others, however, have contended that U.S. policy has changed in some important
areas.  There also are issues as to whether any elements of the “one China” policy
should be reviewed for modification.  The “one China” policy has evolved to cover
three issue areas: sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue. 
Issue Area 1: Sovereignty.  One issue area for U.S. policy concerns
sovereignty, including Taiwan’s juridical status, future unification vs. independence,
referendums, and a new constitution.  The U.S. “one China” policy has differed from
the PRC’s principle on “one China,” and there have been questions about whether
U.S. policy favors or opposes unification, an independent Taiwan, or the status quo.
In general, U.S. policy has stressed the process (peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
question, dialogue, with the assent of Taiwan’s people, and no provocations or
unilateral changes by either side) rather than the outcome (e.g., status quo,
unification, independence, confederation).  At the same time, the ROC, or Taiwan,
has continued to assert its sovereignty, seek membership in the United Nations and
international organizations.  Under the ruling DPP since 2000, the government in
Taipei has made greater use of the name “Taiwan” (vs. “ROC”).17
In 1969 and 1970, on the eve of the Nixon Administration’s contacts with PRC
leaders, the State Department testified to Congress that the juridical matter of the
status of Taiwan remained undetermined.  The State Department also wrote that
in neither [the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 nor the Treaty of Peace between
the Republic of China and Japan of 1952] did Japan cede this area [of Formosa
and the Pescadores] to any particular entity.  As Taiwan and the Pescadores are
not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area
is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution.  Both the
Republic of China and the Chinese Communists disagree with this conclusion
and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of the sovereign state of
China.  The United States recognizes the Government of the Republic of China
as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan and the
Pescadores.18
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However, accounts of President Nixon’s secret talks with PRC Premier Zhou
Enlai in China in 1972 said that Nixon made promises on the question of Taiwan in
return for diplomatic normalization that went beyond the communique issued at the
end.  The Carter Administration later called the promises: “Nixon’s Five Points.”19
Also, according to Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth’s March 1999 testimony,
Nixon pledged no U.S. support for Taiwan independence (second time after
Kissinger’s 1971 promise): “We have not and will not support any Taiwan
independence movement.”20  With the release on December 11, 2003, of declassified
memoranda of conversation of the secret talks between Nixon and Zhou, there was
confirmation that Nixon stated as first of Five Principles that “there is one China, and
Taiwan is a part of China.  There will be no more statements made — if I can control
our bureaucracy — to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined.”
The United States did not explicitly state its own position on the status of
Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques.  In 1972, while still recognizing
the ROC, the Nixon Administration declared that it “acknowledges” that “all Chinese
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait” maintain that there is one China and Taiwan is
a part of China, and that the United States did not challenge that position.  After
shifting diplomatic recognition to the PRC, the United States, in 1979 and 1982,
again “acknowledged the Chinese position”21 of one China and Taiwan is part of
China.  However, the 1982 communique further stated that the United States has no
intention of pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” while
President Reagan’s accompanying statement said that “the Taiwan question is a
matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.”  The
TRA did not discuss the “one China” concept.  In 1994, the Clinton Administration
stated after its Taiwan Policy Review that the United States had “acknowledged” the
Chinese position on one China and that “since 1978, each Administration has
reaffirmed this policy.”
Despite these apparent similarities in U.S. policy statements, some contend that
the U.S. position, since originally formulated in 1972, has adopted the PRC’s “one
China” principle — rather than steadily maintaining neutrality and equal distance
from Beijing and Taipei.  In 1982, Senator John Glenn criticized both the Carter and
Reagan Administrations:
The ambiguous formulation agreed upon in the 1979 joint communique went
considerably further in recognizing the PRC’s claim to Taiwan.  Although the
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word “acknowledged” remained, the object of our acknowledgment shifted
noticeably.  We no longer just acknowledged that both Chinas asserted the
principle that there was one China, but instead acknowledged the Chinese
position that there is but one China.  By dropping the key phrase “all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain” one could interpret that we had moved
from the position of neutral bystander noting the existence of a dispute, to a party
accepting the Chinese assertion that there is one China.  Clearly, this was the
PRC’s interpretation. ...  More recently, Peking’s threats to downgrade relations
with the United States, unless Washington agreed to end all arms sales to
Taiwan, prompted President Reagan to write to China’s Communist Party
Chairman, Hu Yaobang, in May 1982, and assure him that, “Our policy will
continue to be based on the principle that there is but one China.  ...”  We now
assert that it is our policy, U.S. policy, that there is but one China, and although
not stated, indicate implicitly that Taiwan is a part of that one China.  The use of
the qualifier “acknowledged” has been dropped altogether. ...  I do not believe
that anyone can dispute that the U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan has
changed dramatically over the last 10 years.  Let me reiterate one more time, in
1972, we acknowledged that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
maintained that there was but one China.  Today it is U.S. policy that there is but
one China.  Despite this remarkable shift over time, the State Department, at each
juncture, has assured us that our policy remained essentially unchanged.22
Clinton’s Three Noes.  
In August 1995 — earlier than the first public statements showed in 1997 —
President Clinton reportedly sent a secret letter to PRC President Jiang Zemin in
which he stated as the U.S. position that we would: (1) “oppose” Taiwan
independence; (2) would not support “two Chinas” or one China and one Taiwan;
and (3) would not support Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations.23  The
opposition to Taiwan independence seemed to go beyond the promises made by
former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Nixon in 1971 and
1972 of no U.S. support for Taiwan independence.  Later, that wording was
apparently changed from opposition to a neutral stance of non-support.  This letter
reportedly formed the basis of what were later known publicly as the “Three Noes.”
At the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit in Washington, the two leaders issued a joint
statement which included a U.S. position: “the United States reiterates that it adheres
to its ‘one China’ policy and the principles set forth in the three U.S.-China joint
communiques.”  While that joint statement did not include the “Three Noes,” the
Administration decided to have a State Department spokesperson say two days later
that “we certainly made clear that we have a one-China policy; that we don’t support
a one-China, one-Taiwan policy.  We don’t support a two-China policy.  We don’t
support Taiwan independence, and we don’t support Taiwanese membership in
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organizations that require you to be a member state.”  While in China for a summit
in June 1998, President Clinton chose an informal forum to declare: “I had a chance
to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t support independence for
Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China.  And we don’t believe that Taiwan
should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”
Some questioned whether the “Three Noes,” especially as it was publicly
declared by the U.S. President while in the PRC, was a change in U.S. policy.24  U.S.
non-support for a one China, one Taiwan; or two Chinas can be traced to the private
assurances of the Nixon Administration in the early 1970s.  However, the Clinton
Administration, beginning with its Taiwan Policy Review of 1994, added non-
support for Taipei’s entry into the United Nations (U.N.), which became an issue
after Taipei launched its bid in 1993.  In response to President Clinton’s “Three
Noes,” concerned Members in both the Senate and the House nearly unanimously
passed resolutions in July 1998, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. 
The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, argued that the “Three Noes” did not
represent a change in policy.  Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on March 25, 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth stated that
“every point made there [in the “Three Noes”] had been made before by a previous
Administration and there was no change whatsoever.”  In a written response to a
question from Senator Helms, Roth cited as precedents for the “Three Noes” a 1971
statement by Kissinger, a 1972 statement by Nixon, a 1979 statement by Deputy
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and President Reagan’s 1982 Communique.
Bush on Taiwan Independence, Referendums, Constitution.
On April 25, 2001, when President George W. Bush stated the U.S. commitment
to Taiwan as an obligation to use “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself,”
he also said that “a declaration of independence is not the one China policy, and we
will work with Taiwan to make sure that that doesn’t happen.”  Visiting  Beijing in
February 2002, Bush said that U.S. policy on Taiwan was unchanged, but he
emphasized U.S. commitment to the TRA and a peaceful resolution, along with
opposition to provocations by either Beijing or Taipei.  After Taiwan President Chen
Shui-bian said on August 3, 2002, that there is “one country on each side” of the
Taiwan Strait, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) stated, in a second response,
that “we do not support Taiwan independence.”  With Jiang Zemin at his side at a
summit in Crawford, TX, in October 2002, President Bush himself stated that “we
do not support independence.”  
However, there have been questions about whether the Bush Administration has
adjusted U.S. policy after President Chen Shui-bian surprised the United States in
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August 2002 with a speech on “one country on each side” and a call for a holding
referendums.  Specifically, there has been the issue of whether President Bush gave
assurances, at closed meetings starting at that summit in October 2002, to PRC
President Jiang Zemin and later President Hu Jintao that the United States “is
against” or “opposes” unilateral moves in Taiwan toward independence and/or the
status of Taiwan independence, in the interest of stability in the Taiwan Strait.25  A
position in “opposition” to Taiwan independence would represent a shift in policy
focus from the process to the outcome and go beyond President Nixon’s “Five
Principles,” which expressed “non-support” for Taiwan independence.  But U.S.
opposition to Taiwan independence would be consistent with President Clinton’s
secret letter reportedly sent in 1995 to PRC leader Jiang Zemin, as the basis for the
“Three Noes.”  U.S. opposition would also conflict with the stance of the government
of Taiwan, which, under the DPP, has argued that Taiwan is already independent, as
evident since the first democratic presidential election in 1996.26  Still, the
Administration has cited polls in Taiwan showing that a clear majority of the people
prefer the continuation of the status quo to either independence or unification.
After Chen, during campaigns for Taiwan’s presidential election in March 2004,
advocated holding referendums and adopting a new constitution by 2008 — moves
that could have implications for Taiwan’s sovereignty and cross-strait stability, the
Bush Administration called on Chen to adhere to his pledges (“Five Noes”) in his
inaugural address of 2000 (including not promoting a referendum to change the status
quo).  On September 28, 2003, Chen started his call for a new constitution for
Taiwan (with a draft constitution by September 28, 2006; a referendum on the
constitution on December 10, 2006; and enactment of the new constitution on May
20, 2008).  National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on October 14, 2003,
that “nobody should try unilaterally to change the status quo.”27  A White House
official said in an interview on November 26, 2003, that “Taiwan shouldn’t be
moving towards independence; and mainland China shouldn’t be moving towards the
use of force or coercion.”28  Then, Chen announced on November 29 — two days
after the opposition-dominated legislature passed a restrictive law authorizing
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referendums  — that he would still use one provision to hold a “defensive
referendum” on election day.29  Chen argued that the referendum would be a way for
Taiwan’s people to express their opposition to the PLA’s missile threat and would
have nothing to do with the question of unification or independence. 
Nonetheless, Administration officials have had concerns about the volatile
course of current and future political actions in Taiwan (with elections, referendums,
and a new constitution), reforms geared for governance vs sovereignty, and
unnecessary effects on peace and stability, given U.S. commitments to help Taiwan’s
self-defense.  The Bush Administration added a new, clearer stance on December 1,
2003, when the State Department expressed U.S. “opposition” to any referendum that
would change Taiwan’s status or move toward independence.  On the same day, the
Senior Director of Asian Affairs at the White House’s National Security Council,
James Moriarty, reportedly was in Taiwan to pass a letter from Bush to Chen with
concerns about “provocations.”30  Apparently needing a public, stronger, and clearer
U.S. message to Taiwan, appearing next to visiting PRC Premier Wen Jiabao at the
White House on December 9, 2003, President Bush stated opposition to any
unilateral decision by China or Taiwan to change the status quo, as well as opposition
to efforts by Taiwan’s President Chen to change the status quo, in response to a
question about whether Chen should cancel the referendum.  
However, Bush did not make public remarks against the PRC’s threats toward
democratic Taiwan.  Bush also did not counter Wen’s remarks that Bush reiterated
“opposition” to Taiwan independence.  Bush raised questions about whether he
miscalculated the willingness of Chen to back down during his re-election campaign
and risked U.S. credibility, since Chen responded defiantly that he would hold the
“anti-missile, anti-war” referendums as planned and that his intention was to keep
Taiwan’s current independent status quo from being changed.31 
American opinions were divided on the Bush Administration’s statements
toward Taiwan.  Some saw Chen as advancing a provocative agenda of permanent
separation from China while trying to win votes, and supported Bush’s forceful
stance against Chen’s plan for referendums.32  Others criticized President Bush for
being one-sided in appeasing a dictatorship at the expense of Taiwan’s democracy
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while failing to warn against and even possibly inviting aggression from Beijing.33
The co-chairmen of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus in the House wrote a letter to
President Bush, criticizing his stance as a victory for the authoritarian regime of the
PRC at the expense of Taiwan’s democratic reforms.34  Some critics argued for a new
approach, saying that the “one China” policy became “irrelevant” and that there were
national security interests in preventing the “unification” of Taiwan with China.35  In
contrast, another opinion advocated the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan with no
position on its independence and staying out of any conflict in the Taiwan Strait.36
Still, uncertainty has remained about the Bush Administration’s management
of U.S. policy on questions such as options to recalibrate policy in exercising
leverage over Taipei or Beijing; capacity to maintain the delicate balance in
preventing provocations by either side of the strait rather than swerving to one side
or another; perceptions in Taipei and Beijing of mixed messages from Washington;
the U.S. stance on  referendums and a new constitution in Taiwan; definition of
“status quo”; deference to democracy in Taiwan; Taiwan’s long-standing, de facto
independence from China; stronger separate national identity in Taiwan; a proactive
U.S. political role (such as urging dialogue, facilitating talks, or mediating
negotiations) in addition to proactive pressures on defense; the extent of the U.S.
commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense; the increasing PLA threat; and U.S.
worries about Taiwan’s defense spending, acquisitions, and the will to fight.37
On January 16, 2004, President Chen provided the wording for the two
questions, saying that the referendums will ask citizens (1) whether the government
should acquire more missile defense systems if the Chinese Communists do not
withdraw missiles and renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and (2) whether the
government should negotiate with the Chinese Communists to establish a framework
for cross-strait peace and stability.  Chen also promised that if re-elected, he will
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maintain “the status quo of cross-strait peace.”38  On election day on March 20, 2004,
the two referendums failed to be considered valid when 45% of eligible voters cast
ballots (less than the 50% needed).
After the election in March 2004, the White House sent the Senior Director for
Asian Affairs, Michael Green, to Taiwan to urge President Chen to exclude
sovereignty-related issues from constitutional changes.39  In testimony by Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly on April 21, 2004, the Bush Administration warned
Chen of “limitations” in U.S. support for constitutional changes in Taiwan.  In his
inaugural address on May 20, 2004, Chen responded to a number of U.S. concerns.
Visits (or “Transits”) by Taiwan’s President.
  One policy question has concerned the appropriate U.S. response to requests
from Taiwan’s president to enter the United States for official visits, private visits,
or extended transits; to visit Washington, D.C.; and to meet with officials and
Members of Congress.  Congress has expressed strong support for granting such
visits.  Since 1994, the U.S. response has evolved from initially denying Lee Teng-
hui entry into the United States to relaxing restrictions on “transits” for Chen Shui-
bian, and back to strict conditions for proposed transits (not accepted) in May 2006.
In May 1994, the Clinton Administration allowed President Lee Teng-hui to
make a refueling stop in Hawaii but denied him a visa.  In 1995, Lee received a visa
to visit Cornell University, his alma mater.  (Beijing responded with PLA exercises
and missile launches in 1995 and 1996.)  Congress’ view was an important factor
acknowledged by the Administration in its reversal of policy to grant the visa.
In August 2000, the Clinton Administration granted a visa to the newly-elected
President Chen Shui-bian to transit in Los Angeles on his way to South America and
Africa, but, according to Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry, Washington and Taipei had an
understanding that Chen would not hold public events.  Representative Sam
Gejdenson organized a meeting between Chen and about 15 Members of Congress
(some of whom were in town for the Democratic National Convention), but Chen
told them he was “unavailable.”40
In 2001, in granting President Chen Shui-bian “private and unofficial” transits
through New York (May 21-23) and Houston (June 2-3) en route to and from Latin
America, the Bush Administration took a different position on such meetings.  As the
State Department spokesperson said, “we do believe that private meetings between
Members of Congress and foreign leaders advance our national interests, so [Chen]
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may have meetings with Members of Congress.”41  On the night of May 21, 2001, 21
Representatives attended a dinner with Chen in New York, and Representative Tom
DeLay later hosted Chen in Houston.  
In 2003, while considering his safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity, the
Bush Administration again granted President Chen’s requests for transits to and from
Panama through New York (October 31-November 2) and Anchorage (November 4-
5).42  Some Members of Congress personally welcomed Chen, including 16 Members
who were already in New York and met with him.  No Administration officials met
with Chen, other than AIT officials based in Washington.  Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Randall Schriver reportedly canceled a planned meeting with Chen in New
York, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage talked with Chen by phone.43
Chen Shui-bian enjoyed extended transits through Honolulu and Seattle in
August-September 2004, though these were less high-profile than that in New York.
In January 2005, Chen stopped in Guam on the way back to Taiwan from Palau and
the Solomon Islands.  In September 2005, the Bush Administration allowed Chen to
stop one day in Miami on his way to Latin America and in San Francisco on his
return to Taiwan.  The Congressional Human Rights Caucus, via teleconference,
awarded Chen a human rights award while he was in Miami.
However, in May 2006, the Bush Administration was not pleased at repeated
statements from President Chen Shui-bian and adjusted policy to apply conditions
on his proposed U.S. stops so that they would be strict transits (with no activities),
restrictions similar to those for Lee Teng-hui in 1994.  (Chen requested stops in San
Francisco and New York for his visit to Latin America, but President Bush countered
with transits in Honolulu and Anchorage, and Chen refused those U.S. cities.)
Representatives Thomas Tancredo and Dana Rohrabacher sent a letter on May 5,
2006, to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, questioning the decision’s consistency
with legislation; possible linkage to ties with Beijing; use of “humiliating” conditions
on the transits; reversal of policy despite President Bush’s affirmation of a consistent
policy; impact on future U.S. stops; and implication for “playing politics” given the
contrast with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s high-level meeting in
Washington with the opposition KMT chairman, Ma Ying-jeou, two months earlier.
In September 2006, the Administration allowed Chen to stop in Guam, but he had to
switch to a civilian aircraft instead of his “Air Force One” that flew him to Palau.
International Organizations.
Meanwhile, the United States, with strong congressional backing, has voiced
some support for Taiwan’s quest for international space, including participation in
international organizations on transnational issues.  Some advocates view such
participation as preserving a democratic government’s international presence and
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promoting the interests of Taiwan’s people, while others support Taiwan’s separate
identity or independence.  The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review
promised to support Taiwan’s membership in organizations where statehood is not
a prerequisite and to support opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in
organizations where its membership is not possible.  
On May 11, 2001, President Bush wrote to Senator Frank Murkowski, agreeing
that the Administration should “find opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in
organizations in order to make a contribution, even if membership is impossible,”
including concrete ways for Taiwan to benefit from and contribute to the World
Health Organization (WHO).  On April 9, 2002, Representatives in the House formed
a Taiwan Caucus, and, as its first action, it wrote a letter on April 19, 2002, to the
President, seeking support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO.  With worldwide
attention on the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, Secretary of
Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson expressed support for Taiwan in a
speech at the World Health Assembly on May 19, 2003, saying that “the need for
effective public health exists among all peoples” and “that’s why the United States
has strongly supported Taiwan’s inclusion in efforts against SARS and beyond.”
By the annual meeting in 2005, Taiwan lamented that the United States did not
speak up and that the WHO signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the PRC
to govern the WHO’s technical exchanges with Taiwan.  Still, the Bush
Administration “applauded” the WHO and China for taking steps in 2005 to greatly
increase Taiwan’s participation in WHO conferences.44
Select Legislation.
During the 104th Congress, after the Clinton Administration denied President
Lee Teng-hui a visa in May 1994, the Senate, from July to October, passed
amendments introduced by Senator Brown to ensure that Taiwan’s President can
enter the United States on certain occasions.  Two amendments (for S. 2182 and H.R.
4606) that passed were not retained, but the amendment to the Immigration and
Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 was enacted.  Upon signing it into law
(P.L. 103-416) on October 25, 1994, President Clinton said that he would construe
Section 221 as expressing Congress’ view.  Later, Congress overwhelmingly passed
the bipartisan H.Con.Res. 53 expressing the sense of Congress that the President
should promptly welcome a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui to his alma
mater, Cornell University, and a transit stop in Anchorage, Alaska, to attend a
conference.  The House passed the resolution by 396-0 on May 2, and the Senate
passed it by 97-1 on May 9, 1995 (with Senator Johnston voting Nay and Senators
Moynihan and Warner not voting).
During the 106th Congress, in 1999, Congress legislated a requirement for semi-
annual reports on such U.S. support, in Section 704 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FYs 2000 and 2001 (P.L. 106-113).  Also in 1999, Congress
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passed legislation (P.L. 106-137) requiring a report by the Secretary of State on
efforts to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO.  In January 2000, the State
Department submitted the report, saying that the United States does not support
Taiwan’s membership in organizations, such as the U.N. or WHO, where statehood
is a requirement for membership, but that it supports any arrangements acceptable to
the WHO membership to allow for Taiwan to participate in the work of the WHO.45
In October 2000, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 390, expressing the sense
of Congress that the State Department’s report failed to endorse Taiwan’s
participation in international organizations and that the United States should fulfill
the commitment of the Taiwan Policy Review to more actively support Taiwan’s
participation in international organizations.  
In the 107th Congress, on May 17, 2001, Members in the House agreed without
objection to H.Con.Res. 135 to welcome President Chen Shui-bian upon his visit. 
Also, Congress passed a bill, P.L. 107-10, authorizing the Secretary of State to
initiate a U.S. plan to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the annual summit of the
World Health Assembly in May 2001 in Geneva, Switzerland.46  Then,
Representative Sherrod Brown and Senator Torricelli introduced H.R. 2739 and S.
1932 to amend the law to target the May 2002 meeting.  H.R. 2739 was passed and
enacted as P.L. 107-158 on April 4, 2002. 
As enacted on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2003 (P.L. 107-228), authorized — at the Bush Administration’s request — U.S.
departments or agencies (including the Departments of State and Defense) to assign
or detail employees to the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the non-profit
corporation (with offices in Washington and Taipei) that has handled the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship in the absence of diplomatic ties since 1979 under the TRA.
(Personnel at AIT had been technically “separated” from government service for a
period of time, raising issues about employment status, benefits, recruitment, etc.)
The legislation also expressed the sense of Congress that AIT and the residence of
its director in Taipei should publicly display the American flag “in the same manner
as United States embassies, consulates, and official residences throughout the world.”
(AIT in Taipei has flown the U.S. flag only occasionally.)
In the 108th Congress, the House and Senate passed S. 243 to authorize the
Secretary of State to initiate a U.S. plan to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the
World Health Assembly in May 2003.  Upon signing the bill as P.L. 108-28 on May
29, 2003, President Bush stated that “the United States fully supports the overall goal
of Taiwan’s participation in the work of the World Health Organization (WHO),
including observership” but considered the Act to be consistent with the “one China”
policy.  On October 30, 2003, the House passed H.Con.Res. 302 by 416-0 to
welcome President Chen to the United States.  
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On April 21, 2004, and May 6, 2004, the House and Senate respectively passed
H.R. 4019 and S. 2092 in support of Taiwan’s efforts to gain observer status in the
WHO and to make it an annual requirement to have an unclassified report from the
Secretary of State on the U.S. plan to help obtain that status for Taiwan.  This change
resulted in the end of annual congressional statements and votes on this issue.  In
signing S. 2092 into law (P.L. 108-235) on June 14, 2004, President Bush stated that
the United States fully supports the participation of Taiwan in the work of the WHO,
including observer status.  However, he also declared that his Administration shall
construe the reporting requirement by using his authority to “withhold information”
which could impair foreign relations or other duties of the Executive Branch.
On June 29, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5672, a bill on State Department
Appropriations for FY2007, that included Representative Thomas Tancredo’s
amendment to ban funds from being used to enforce the “Guidelines on Relations
with Taiwan.”  At the start of the Bush Administration, the State Department issued
guidelines to continue the policy to restrict contact with Taiwan’s officials and ban
travel to Taiwan for State or Defense Department officials above the level of office
director or for military personnel above the rank of O-6 (colonel, navy captain).47
Issue Area 2: Use of Force.  The PRC has never renounced its claimed right
to use force in what it sees as an internal problem and, moreover, has voiced more
explicitly and demonstrated clearly its willingness to use force for political if not
military objectives — despite its announced policy of “peaceful unification” since
1979.  Since the early 1990s, the PRC has purchased more advanced arms from the
Soviet Union/Russia and built up its theater missile force.48  In December 1992 and
March 1993, PRC President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng began to warn of
having to use “drastic” or “resolute” measures to prevent Taiwan independence.
Then, in 1995-1996, the PRC launched provocative military exercises, including
missile “test-firings,” to express displeasure with then Taiwanese President Lee
Teng-hui’s private visit to the United States and to intimidate voters before
democratic elections in Taiwan.  The United States believes that the PLA accelerated
its buildup since the mid-1990s, after the Taiwan Strait Crisis and Lee Teng-hui’s
1999 statement on “special state-to-state ties.”
Three Ifs.
In February 2000, on the eve of another presidential election in Taiwan, the PRC
issued its second White Paper on Taiwan, reaffirming the peaceful unification policy
but adding a new precondition for the use of force.  As one of “Three Ifs,” the PRC
officially warned that even if Taiwan indefinitely refuses to negotiate a peaceful
settlement, the PRC would be compelled to use force to achieve unification.
However, no deadline was issued.  The White Paper also warned the United States
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not to sell arms to Taiwan or pursue any form of alliance with Taiwan, including
cooperation in missile defense.
Commitment to Help Taiwan’s Self-Defense.
The United States has expressed the consistent position — in increasingly
stronger ways — that any resolution of the Taiwan question be peaceful.49  Congress
passed and President Carter signed the TRA of 1979, adding U.S. commitment to
assist Taiwan’s self-defense and a potential U.S. role in maintaining peace in the
strait.  The TRA left the U.S. obligation to help defend Taiwan somewhat ambiguous
and did not bind future U.S. decisions.  Section 2(b)(4) states that the United States
will consider with “grave concern” any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s
future.  The TRA also excluded the islands off the mainland (e.g., Quemoy and
Matsu) in its security coverage over Taiwan.  Nonetheless, the Section 2(b)(6) of the
TRA declares it to be policy to maintain the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people on Taiwan [emphasis added].
In 1982, President Reagan signed the Joint Communique on reducing arms sales
to Taiwan, but he also stated in public and internal clarifications that U.S. arms sales
will continue in accordance with the TRA and with the full expectation that the
PRC’s approach to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful.
President George H. W. Bush decided in September 1992 to sell 150 F-16 fighters
to Taiwan, citing concerns about the cross-strait military balance.  
On March 10 and 11, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced decisions to
deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan, after the PRC
announced renewed PLA exercises that would include further missile “test-firings”
toward Taiwan and Congress introduced legislation on helping to defend the ROC.
President Clinton demonstrated that there might be grave consequences, as well as
grave concern, to non-peaceful efforts to determine Taiwan’s future.  However, the
Joint Statement at the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit did not mention the TRA.
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In April 2001, President George W. Bush publicly stated the U.S. commitment
to Taiwan as an obligation to do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself”
[emphasis added].50  Visiting two allies then China in February 2002, the President,
in Tokyo, cited the U.S. commitment to Taiwan in the context of support for five
regional allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand) — to
applause from the Diet, or Japan’s legislature.  Then, in Beijing, Bush emphasized
U.S. commitments to the TRA and a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question,
while voicing opposition to provocations from either side.  
However, indicating concerns about miscalculations of U.S. views in Taiwan,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless told Taiwan’s Deputy
Defense Minister Chen Chao-min in February 2003 that, while the President said we
will do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself, Taiwan “should not view
America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a
substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense.”51
In November 2003, with concerns about PRC threats and Taiwan President
Chen Shui-bian’s efforts to hold referendums, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage confirmed a reporter’s question that the TRA is not a defense treaty.
Armitage added that the TRA guides policy in providing Taiwan “sufficient defense
articles for her self-defense” and “also requires the United States to keep sufficient
force in the Asia Pacific area to be able to keep the area calm.”  Armitage reaffirmed
that the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense, with no defense treaty,
“doesn’t go beyond that in the Taiwan Relations Act, and we have good, competent
military forces there.”52  President Bush appeared with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao in
the Oval Office on December 9, 2003, and stated U.S. opposition to any unilateral
decisions made by the leader of Taiwan to change the status quo.  
In April 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly further clarified U.S.
policy after Chen Shui-bian’s re-election in March and warned Taiwan not to dismiss
PRC statements as “empty threats” and warned of “limitations” to U.S. support for
constitutional changes in Taiwan.  At the same time, Assistant Secretary of Defense
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for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman warned Beijing that its attempt to use
force would “inevitably” involve the United States.53
Aside from the issue of whether the U.S. strategy on assisting Taiwan’s self-
defense should be ambiguous or clear in a policy seeking deterrence towards Beijing
and Taipei, a third view advocates the removal of any defense commitment (implicit
or explicit) while continuing to sell weapons for Taiwan’s self-defense.54
Arms Sales and Military Relationship.
Despite the absence of diplomatic and alliance relations, U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan have been significant.  Moreover, beginning after tensions in the Taiwan
Strait in 1995-1996, the Pentagon under the Clinton Administration quietly expanded
the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to levels unprecedented since 1979.
These broader exchanges reportedly have increased attention to so-called “software,”
discussions over strategy, logistics, command and control, and plans in the event of
an invasion of Taiwan.55
The George W. Bush Administration has continued and expanded the closer
military ties at different levels.  In April 2001, President Bush announced he would
drop the 20-year-old annual arms talks process used in relations with Taiwan’s
military in favor of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan’s requests on an as-
needed basis.  Then, the Bush Administration granted a visa for ROC Defense
Minister Tang Yiau-ming to visit the United States to attend a private conference
held by the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council on March 10-12, 2002, in St. Petersburg,
FL, making him the first ROC defense minister to come to the United States on a
non-transit purpose since 1979.56  Tang met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz, who told the conference that the United States is willing to help Taiwan’s
military to strengthen civilian control, enhance jointness, and rationalize arms
acquisitions.57  In July 2002, the Pentagon issued a report to Congress on the PLA,
warning that “the PRC’s ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over its
declared preference for resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful means.”
The report also stressed that “Beijing has developed a range of non-lethal coercive
options, including political/diplomatic, economic, and military measures.”58  The
assessment has policy implications, since according to the TRA, it is U.S. policy to
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maintain the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of “coercion”
against Taiwan’s security, or social or economic system.  In 2002, the Bush
Administration requested legislation be passed to authorize the assignment of
personnel from U.S. departments and agencies to AIT, with implications for the
assignment of active-duty military personnel to Taiwan for the first time since 1979.
(See the discussion below of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003.)
Although there has been much interest among U.S. academic circles and think
tanks in pursuing talks with China on its military buildup and increased U.S. security
assistance to Taiwan,59 a catalyst for this debate among policymakers arose out of the
U.S.-PRC summit in Crawford, TX, on October 25, 2002.  As confirmed to Taiwan’s
legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen, and reported in Taiwan’s media,
PRC leader Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in China’s
deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraints in U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan.60  President Bush reportedly did not respond to Jiang’s linkage.  Policy
considerations include the TRA (under which the United States has based its defense
assistance to Taiwan on the threat that it faces), the 1982 Joint Communique (which
discussed reductions in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan premised on the PRC’s peaceful
unification policy), and the 1982 “Six Assurances” to Taiwan (which said the United
States did not agree to hold prior consultations with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan).  On April 21, 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified to the
House International Relations Committee that if the PRC meets its stated obligations
to pursue a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and matches its rhetoric with a
military posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to Taiwan, “it follows
logically that Taiwan’s defense requirements will change.”
Select Legislation.
Since the PLA’s provocative exercises and missile launches in 1995 and 1996,
Congress increasingly has asserted its role vis-a-vis the Administration in
determining arms sales to Taiwan, as stipulated by Section 3(b) of the TRA, as well
as in exercising its oversight of the TRA, including Section 2(b)(6) on the U.S.
capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.
During the 104th Congress, in early 1996, Congress became increasingly
concerned about provocative PLA exercises held the previous summer and again on
the eve of Taiwan’s presidential election in March 1996 (with “test-firings” of M-9
short-range ballistic missiles to target areas close to the two Taiwan ports of
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Kaohsiung and Keelung).  Introduced by Representative Chris Cox on March 7,
passed by the House on March 19, and passed by the Senate on March 21, 1996,
H.Con.Res. 148 expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should assist
in defending the ROC.  On March 13, 1996, during markup of H.Con.Res. 148 in the
House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Delegate Eni
Faleomavaega noted that House and Senate resolutions prompted the Clinton
Administration to deploy the USS Independence and USS Nimitz carriers.  The
resolution cited Section 3(c) of the TRA, which directs the President to inform
Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of
the people on Taiwan and to determine the U.S. response along with Congress.
However, on March 14, 1996, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Winston Lord told the Subcommittee that “however serious, the present
situation does not constitute a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude contemplated by the
drafters of the Taiwan Relations Act” and that “if warranted by circumstances, we
will act under Section 3(c) of the TRA, in close consultation with the Congress.”
In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
105-261) required the Secretary of Defense to study the U.S. missile defense systems
that could protect and could be transferred to “key regional allies,” defined in the
conference report as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.61  In addition, the conference
report (H.Rept. 105-746 of the FY1999 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-262)
required a report from the Pentagon on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, in
both classified and unclassified forms.62
In the 106th Congress, some Members supported the “Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act (TSEA)” (S. 693, Helms; H.R. 1838, DeLay) as needed to upgrade
U.S. assistance for Taiwan’s defense in the face of greater PLA threats.  Other
Members and the Clinton Administration opposed the bill as unnecessary and
provocative in a delicate situation, while saying that the Pentagon has already
exercised the authority under the TRA to provide arms to and deepen military ties
with Taiwan.  The TSEA was not enacted, although the House passed H.R. 1838 on
February 1, 2000 by 341-70.63  The TSEA increased attention to U.S.-Taiwan
military exchanges, including that on communication and training.  The Pentagon
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was said to have supported the spirit of the bill, although not its passage.64 Also, the
FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65) enacted a requirement for
the Pentagon to submit annual reports on PRC military power and the security
situation in the Taiwan Strait.65
In asserting its role in decision-making on arms sales to Taiwan, Congress
passed language, introduced by Senator Lott, in the FY2000 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (in Div. B of P.L. 106-113), requiring the Secretary of State to
consult with Congress to devise a mechanism for congressional input in determining
arms sales to Taiwan.  Again, in the FY2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
(Sec. 581 of P.L. 106-429), Congress passed the Taiwan Reporting Requirement,
requiring the President to consult on a classified basis with Congress 30 days prior
to the next round of arms sales talks.  (Those required consultations took place on
March 16, 2001.)  
In addition to examining defense transfers to Taiwan, Congress also began to
look closer at U.S. military deployments.  The consolidated appropriations legislation
for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113) required a report on the operational planning of the
Department of Defense to implement the TRA and any gaps in knowledge about PRC
capabilities and intentions affecting the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.66
In the 107th Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L.
107-107), enacted December 28, 2001, authorized the President to transfer (by sale)
the four Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan (Sec. 1011), under Section 21 of the AECA.
Also, Section 1221 of the act required a new section in the annual report on PRC
military power (as required by P.L. 106-65) to assess the PLA’s military acquisitions
and any implications for the security of the United States and its friends and allies.
The scope of arms transfers to be covered was not limited to those from Russia and
other former Soviet states, as in the original House language (H.R. 2586).67
The House-passed FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act contained
Section 1202 seeking to require the Secretary of Defense to implement a
comprehensive plan to conduct combined training and exchanges of senior officers
with Taiwan’s military and to “enhance interoperability” with Taiwan’s military.
The language was similar to that of Section 5(b) in the Taiwan Security Enhancement
Act proposed in the 106th Congress.  The Senate’s version did not have the language.
As enacted on December 2, 2002, the legislation (P.L. 107-314) contains a revised
section (1210) requiring a Presidential report 180 days after the act’s enactment on
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the feasibility and advisability of conducting combined operational training and
exchanges of senior officers with Taiwan’s military. (High-level and expanding
military exchanges have taken place in the United States, while U.S. flag and general
officers may not visit Taiwan.)
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115), as
enacted on January 10, 2002, brought unprecedented close coordination between the
Executive and Legislative branches on arms sales to Taiwan.  Section 573 required
the Departments of State and Defense to provide detailed briefings (not specified as
classified) to congressional committees (including those on appropriations) within
90 days of enactment and not later than every 120 days thereafter during FY2002.
The briefings were to report on U.S.-Taiwan discussions on potential sales of defense
articles or services.  
Some Members in the House and Senate called for ensuring regular and high-
level consultations with Taiwan and a role for Congress in determining arms sales
to Taiwan, after President Bush announced on April 24, 2001, that he would drop the
annual arms talks process with Taiwan in favor of normal, routine considerations on
an “as-needed” basis.  Enacted as P.L. 107-228, the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for FY2003 authorized — at the Bush Administration’s request — the
Department of State and other departments or agencies (including the Department of
Defense) to detail employees to AIT (Section 326); required that Taiwan be “treated
as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally” (Section 1206); required
consultations with Congress on U.S. security assistance to Taiwan every 180 days
(Section 1263); and authorized the sale to Taiwan of the four Kidd-class destroyers
(Section 1701). Section 326, amending the Foreign Service Act of 1980, has
significant implications for the assignment of government officials to Taiwan,
including active-duty military personnel for the first time since 1979.  
In signing the bill into law on September 30, 2002, President Bush issued a
statement that included his view of Section 1206 (on a “major non-NATO ally”).  He
said that “Section 1206 could be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‘one China’
policy of the United States when, in fact, that U.S. policy remains unchanged.  To the
extent that this section could be read to purport to change United States policy, it
impermissibly interferes with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the
Nation’s foreign affairs.”  The Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Michael Wynne, submitted a letter to Congress on August
29, 2003, that designated Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally.”
Issue Area 3: Dialogue.  President Nixon in 1972, President Carter in 1978,
and President Reagan in 1982 publicly stated the U.S. expectation that the Chinese
themselves will settle the Taiwan question.  The Reagan Administration also gave
“Six Assurances” to Taiwan in 1982.  The assurances to Taipei, before the United
States and the PRC issued the 1982 Joint communique, included promises that
Washington would not mediate between Taipei and Beijing, and would not pressure
Taipei to negotiate with Beijing. 
CRS-26
Urging Cross-Strait Dialogue.
One policy question concerns the extent of U.S. pressure for cross-strait
dialogue and the U.S. role in any talks or negotiations to resolve the Taiwan question.
As Taipei and Beijing’s economic relationship grew to significant levels by the early
1990s and the two sides began to talk directly through “unofficial organizations,” the
Clinton Administration increasingly voiced its support for the cross-strait dialogue,
encouraging Taipei in particular.  Like a bystander, the Department of State said in
its Taiwan Policy Review of 1994 that “the United States applauds the continuing
progress in the cross-strait dialogue.”  After talks broke off and military tensions
flared, however, the Clinton Administration, after 1996, privately and publicly urged
both sides to hold this dialogue as an added part of a more proactive U.S. policy.  In
July 1996, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake visited China and planned a
meeting (later canceled) with Wang Daohan, head of the PRC’s organization for
cross-strait talks.  At the 1997 U.S.-PRC summit, President Clinton urged for a
peaceful resolution “as soon as possible” and that “sooner is better than later.”
In March 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stan Roth publicly raised the
possibility of “interim agreements” between Beijing and Taipei, after several
prominent former Clinton Administration officials made similar proposals.  Roth’s
mention of possible “interim agreements” raised concerns in Taipei that it was a
proposal by the Clinton Administration to pressure Taipei into negotiating with
Beijing, according to Taiwan media reports.  
Roth’s remarks came in the context of suggestions to reduce cross-strait tensions
issued by former or future Clinton Administration officials.  In January 1998, a
delegation of former officials led by former Defense Secretary William Perry had
visited Beijing and Taipei, reportedly passing a message from the PRC that it was
willing to resume talks with Taiwan.  The February 21, 1998 Washington Post
reported that the delegation was part of the Administration’s effort to have a “track
two” dialogue with Beijing and Taipei and to encourage resumption of cross-strait
talks.  At a February 1998 conference in Taipei, Kenneth Lieberthal (a University of
Michigan professor who later joined the NSC as the Senior Director for Asian Affairs
in August 1998) had proposed a 50-year “interim arrangement” in which the PRC (as
“China”) would renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and the ROC (as “Taiwan,
China”) would agree not to declare independence (Reuters, March 1, 1998).
In the March 8, 1998 Washington Post, Joseph Nye (former Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs) had proposed a “three-part package”
that would include a clarification that Washington would not recognize or defend
Taiwan independence but also would not accept the use of force against Taiwan, and
a “one country, three systems” approach.  Also in March 1998, former National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake had visited Taiwan and reportedly encouraged
resumption of cross-strait talks.  In Foreign Affairs (July/August 1998), Chas.
Freeman (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs)
had urged Washington to encourage Beijing and Washington to defer negotiations
on their long-term relationship for a certain period, such as 50 years, and to
reevaluate arms sales to Taiwan.  In February-March 1999, Perry had led another
delegation, including retired Admiral Joseph Prueher (later nominated in September
1999 to be ambassador to Beijing), and the group made suggestions to the PRC and
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Taiwan on how to reduce cross-strait tensions, according to Notes from the National
Committee (Winter/Spring 1999).  Later, on September 5, 1999, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Susan Shirk mentioned “one country, three systems” as a possible
approach for “one China,” Taiwan media reported.
In contrast to this stress on dialogue, the George W. Bush Administration started
by emphasizing deterrence and approved Taiwan’s requests for major weapon
systems in 2001.  In July 2004, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice did urge
leaders in Beijing to resume cross-strait talks and offered a vague U.S. role “to
further dialogue if it is helpful.”68  Although the Bush Administration repeatedly has
stated that Beijing should talk to the duly-elected leaders in Taipei, the
Administration has continued the approach of non-mediation in any talks by those
two parties.  In 2005, in answer to Representative Leach about a U.S. role as
“facilitator,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver vaguely responded
that good U.S. relations with Beijing and Taipei allow Washington to “assist the two
sides in getting to the negotiating table on mutually agreeable terms.”69  
Lamenting a “graveyard of missed opportunities” in cross-strait ties, a former
Chairman of AIT, Richard Bush, thoroughly assessed this question of possible U.S.
roles and concluded that greater U.S. involvement to encourage direct dialogue
makes sense and that the role should be limited to “intellectual facilitation” to clarify
policy stances and objectives of each side.70  Ken Lieberthal called again for U.S.
encouragement of cross-strait negotiation for an agreed framework.71
Three Pillars and “Assent” of Taiwan’s People.
In July 1999, the Clinton Administration’s stance on cross-strait dialogue
culminated in the President’s articulation of a new phrase: that U.S. policy has “three
pillars” (one China, peaceful resolution, and cross-strait dialogue).  Recognizing
Taiwan’s newly established status as a democracy, however, President Clinton in
February 2000 added the U.S. expectation that the cross-strait dispute will be
resolved not only peacefully, but also “with the assent” of Taiwan’s people.
Bush Administration’s Re-emphasis of the “Six Assurances”.
The George W. Bush Administration began after Chen Shui-bian of the new
ruling DPP became ROC President in May 2000.  The Bush Administration
indicated that it would not pressure Taipei to hold cross-strait dialogue, re-
emphasizing the “Six Assurances” given to Taipei by President Reagan in 1982.  At
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a hearing in March 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell assured Senator Jesse
Helms that the “Six Assurances” remain U.S. policy and that the Administration
would not favor consulting the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.72  On June 12, 2001,
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified to the House International Relations
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific that U.S. defensive arms sales to Taiwan
make a peaceful cross-strait resolution more likely.  He said that “the central question
is how cross-strait relations can move from a focus on the military balance toward
a focus on ways to begin resolving differences between Taipei and Beijing.”  While
calling for a resumption of direct dialogue, economic cooperation, and mutual
understanding, Kelly also said that “the PRC cannot ignore the elected
representatives of the people of Taiwan.”  While visiting Taiwan at about the same
time that PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen signaled a new receptive policy toward the
ruling DPP in Taiwan, Richard Bush, Chairman of AIT, said on January 28, 2002,
that “the United States favors and encourages dialogue but has no intention of serving
as a mediator in this dispute or of pressuring Taiwan to negotiate.”  He added that “it
does not seem constructive for one side to set pre-conditions for a resumption of
dialogue that the other side even suspects would be tantamount to conceding a
fundamental issue before discussion begins.”  
In March 2002, Assistant Secretary of State Kelly told attendees at a conference
that the Bush Administration would continue to uphold the “Six Assurances,”
meaning no U.S. mediation and no pressure on Taiwan to go to the bargaining table.73
In testimony in April 2004, after Chen Shui-bian’s re-election in the March election,
Kelly again reaffirmed the “Six Assurances,” but explicitly warned  that “a secure
and self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political
interaction and dialogue with the PRC, and we expect Taiwan will not interpret our
support as a blank check to resist such dialogue.”  He urged both Beijing and Taipei
to pursue dialogue “as soon as possible” and “without preconditions.”74
Select Legislation.
As enacted on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2003 (P.L. 107-228), reaffirmed President Clinton’s February 2000 statement and
expressed the sense of Congress that any resolution of the Taiwan issue must be
peaceful and “include the assent of the people of Taiwan.”
Policy Issues
In short, since 1971, U.S. Presidents and other top officials — both secretly and
publicly — have continued to articulate a “one China” policy in understandings with
the PRC.  Nonetheless, policymakers have continued to face unresolved issues, while
the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the
CRS-29
early 1970s.  Since the 1990s, there have been criticisms, especially from Congress,
that successive Administrations shifted the U.S. position closer to that of Beijing’s
 — on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue.  Yet, since the 1990s,
successive Administrations also have shown more explicit opposition — through
arms sales, force deployments, deeper U.S.-Taiwan military ties, and public
statements —  to any PRC efforts to use force to determine Taiwan’s future.  Thus,
in any review of U.S. policy, Congress and the Administration continue to face
critical issues under the rubric of the “one China” policy, including:
! Are cross-strait political, economic, and military trends serving U.S.
interests in peace and stability, and what is the risk of conflict or
coercion with U.S. involvement compared to the likelihood of
economic and political integration across the Taiwan Strait?
! What are probable outcomes (e.g., status quo, unification,
separation, confederation), and how might U.S. interests be affected?
! What are the strategies and objectives of Beijing and Taipei?
! How well are the elements of diplomacy and deterrence balanced in
U.S. policy?
! Should Washington change any elements of policy, including past
assurances to Beijing or Taipei?
! Should U.S. policy positions (support, non-support, opposition) be
clarified to deter provocations from Beijing and Taipei (e.g., on use
of force or coercion, Taipei’s sovereign status or moves toward
independence, or Taiwan’s international participation)?
! Should the United States proactively deepen its role (e.g.,
facilitation, mediation) to encourage cross-strait dialogue or
accommodation?  Should a special coordinator be appointed?
! How should defense policies (on arms sales, military cooperation,
U.S. force deployments, missile defense) be carried out to increase
U.S. leverage in Taiwan, deter conflict, and counter coercion?
! What is the extent of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense and
the nature of the U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship?  What is the
U.S. position on Taiwan’s programs for offensive missiles?
! How are U.S. policies coordinated with those of our allies and
friends in Asia, particularly with Japan and Australia?
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Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
In Part II below, this CRS Report provides documented excerpts from key
statements on “one China” as articulated by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, in
addition to the three Communiques and the TRA, since the United States first
reached understandings with the PRC in 1971.  The highlights also give a
comprehensive look at significant policy statements and events in Washington,
Beijing, as well as Taipei.  This compilation identifies relatively significant
statements, especially those indicating a new element in policy of those governments.
The statements also include authoritative accounts of private presidential assurances
on U.S. policy.  The three perspectives on “one China” are placed in chronological
order under successive U.S. Administrations.  The actual texts are placed in italics.
Statements During Nixon Administration
Kissinger’s Secret Talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai.75
July 9, 1971
Our military presence in Taiwan at this moment is composed of two elements,
the two-thirds of it which is related to activities in other parts of Asia [the Vietnam
War] and the one-third of it which is related to the defense of Taiwan.  We are
prepared to remove that part related to activities other than to the defense of Taiwan,
that’s two-thirds of our force ... within a specified brief period of time after the
ending of the war in Indochina.  We are prepared to begin reducing our other forces
on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military questions need not be a
principal obstacle between us.  I may say, incidentally, that these are personal
decisions of President Nixon which have not yet been discussed with our
bureaucracy or with Congress, and so should be treated with great confidence.
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76 White House, Memorandum of Conversation, February 22, 1972, 2:10pm-6:00pm.   On
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77 White House, Memorandum of Conversation, February 24, 1972, 5:15pm-8:05pm,
classified as Top Secret until release as declassified documents on December 11, 2003.
As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a “two Chinas”
solution or a “one China, one Taiwan” solution.
[On Zhou Enlai’s question of whether the United States would support the
Taiwan independence movement]: We would not support this.
Nixon’s “Five Principles” in Secret Talks with Zhou Enlai.
February 22, 1972 76
Principle one.  There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China.  There will
be no more statements made — if I can control our bureaucracy — to the effect that
the status of Taiwan is undetermined.
Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement.
Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan
from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan
from supporting a Taiwan independence movement.  I will only say here I cannot say
what Japan will do, but so long as the U.S. has influence with Japan — we have in
this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister’s government — we do not want
Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so.
The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
issue that can be worked out.  And related to that point, we will not support any
military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the
Mainland.
Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic.  We
know that the issue of Taiwan is a barrier to complete normalization, but within the
framework I have previously described, we seek normalization and we will work
toward that goal and will try to achieve it.
Nixon on Withdrawing U.S. Military Forces from Taiwan.
February 24, 197277
With regard to Taiwan, I do not believe a permanent American presence —
whatever happens in our meetings — is necessary to American security....  My goal
is the withdrawal of our remaining forces, not just two-thirds, but all forces,
including the remaining one-third....  It must be consistent with ... the so-called Nixon
Doctrine.  Under that Doctrine, we are cutting our forces in Korea....  Two-thirds
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will go, hopefully as soon as we can finish our Vietnam involvement.  My plan also
is one which reduces the one-third and withdraws it during the period I have the
power to act.  But I cannot do it before January of next year.  It has to be over a
period of four years.  Now if someone asks me when I return, do you have a deal with
the Prime Minister that you are going to withdraw all American forces from Taiwan,
I will say “no.”  But I am telling the Prime Minister that it is my plan....78
U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (Shanghai Communique).
February 27, 1972
The Chinese reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question
obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the
Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China;
Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the
liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the
right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn
from Taiwan.  The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at
the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two
Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains
to be determined.”
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges79 that all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait80 maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan
is a part of China.  The United States Government does not challenge that position.
It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themselves.  With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the
withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan.  In the
meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan
as the tension in the area diminishes.
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82 Public Papers of the Presidents, Gerald Ford, 1974.
Mao on Use of Force.81
November 12, 1973
As for the question of our relations with Taiwan, that is quite complex.  I do not
believe in a peaceful transition. ...  They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries [the
Nationalists on Taiwan].  How could they cooperate with us?  I say that we can do
without Taiwan for the time being, and let it come after “100 years.”
Statements During Ford Administration
President Ford’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress.82
August 12, 1974
To the People’s Republic of China, whose legendary hospitality I enjoyed, I
pledge continuity in our commitment to the principles of the Shanghai communique.
The new relationship built on those principles has demonstrated that it serves serious
and objective mutual interests and has become an enduring feature of the world
scene.
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Statements During Carter Administration
U.S. Statement on Diplomatic Relations Between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China.83
December 15, 197884
As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People’s
Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.
In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain
commercial, cultural and other relations without official government representation
and without diplomatic relations.  The Administration will seek adjustments to our
laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other
non-governmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after
normalization.  The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a
peaceful and prosperous future.  The United States continues to have an interest in
the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be
settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.
PRC Statement on Establishing China-U.S. Diplomatic Relations.85
December 16, 1978
As is known to all, the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole
legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of China.  The question of Taiwan
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was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and
the United States.  It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit
of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint efforts, thus enabling the
normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the two countries.  As
for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying
the country, it is entirely China’s internal affair.
ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo’s Statement.86
December 29, 1978
The Republic of China is an independent sovereign state with a legitimately
established government based on the Constitution of the Republic of China.  It is an
effective government, which has the wholehearted support of her people.  The
international status and personality of the Republic of China cannot be changed
merely because of the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by any country
of the world.  The legal status and international personality of the Republic of China
is a simple reality which the United States must recognize and respect.
PRC’s New Year’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.87
January 1, 1979
Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. ...  Taiwan’s
separation from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and against
our national interests and aspirations, and this state of affairs must not be allowed
to continue. ...  
Unification of China now fits in with the direction of popular feeling and the
general trend of development.  The world in general recognizes only one China, with
the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government.  The
recent conclusion of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the
normalization of relations between China and the United States show still more
clearly that no one can stop this trend. ... 
We place great hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan
authorities.  The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and
opposed an independent Taiwan.    This is our common stand and the basis for our
cooperation. ...  
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The Chinese Government has ordered the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] to
stop the bombardment of Quemoy and other islands as of today.  A state of military
confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan Strait.  This can
only create artificial tension.  We hold that first of all this military confrontation
should be ended through discussion between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary
prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts and
exchanges in whatever area. ...
U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations (Normalization Communique).
January 1, 1979
The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s
Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.  Within this context, the
people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial
relations with the people of Taiwan.
The Government of the United States of America acknowledges88 the Chinese89
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8.
Enacted April 10, 1979
Section 2(b)  It is the policy of the United States 
(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural,
and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on
Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the
Western Pacific area;90 
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security,
and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international
concern; 
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defense treaties.  He was “particularly concerned with other dangers which in fact seemed
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(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; 
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;91 
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and 
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic
system, of the people on Taiwan.92
Sec. 3(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability.
(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of
such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of
Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law.  Such determination of
Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in
connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.
(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to
the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any
danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom.  The President and the
Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate
action by the United States in response to any such danger.
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93 Congress considered the security implications for the United States of whether the
definition of “Taiwan” includes the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu (only several
miles off the mainland coast).  The House report (p. 16) on the TRA noted that the
definitions are “illustrative, not limiting.”  Nonetheless, Rep. Zablocki (chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee) explained that his committee had excluded Quemoy and
Matsu from the definition.  He pointed out that these islands had been “deliberately left out
of the mutual defense treaty,” and “we should not be expanding the U.S. security
commitment beyond what was in the treaty.”  He noted that “Quemoy and Matsu are
considered by both Taipei and by Peking to be part of mainland China.”  He concluded that
“as far as the reference in the committee report is concerned, it does not extend our security
commitment in its referral to Quemoy and Matsu.”  (Wolff and Simon, p. 282-283.)
Sec. 4(b)(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign
countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include
and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.
Sec. 15(2) The term “Taiwan” includes, as the context may require, the islands
of Taiwan and the Pescadores,93 the people on those islands, corporations and other
entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those
islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as
the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing
authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof).
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94 “Ye Jianying Explains Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful
Unification,” Xinhua [New China News Agency], September 30, 1981, in FBIS.  According
to the Chinese report, Ye spoke as the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress (the PRC’s legislature).  However, Ye enjoyed significant stature in the
Chinese leadership largely because he was a Marshal, the highest rank in the PLA.  Harding
(p. 113, 155) wrote that Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang later described the plan to President
Reagan at a meeting in Cancun in October 1981, seeking reductions in and an end to U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan.
Statements During Reagan Administration
PRC Leader Ye Jianying’s Nine-Point Proposal.94
September 30, 1981
Now, I would take this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the
return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful unification
[proclaimed on New Year’s Day 1979]:
1. In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation as
early as possible, we propose that talks be held between the Communist Party
of China and the Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] of China on a reciprocal
basis so that the two parties will cooperate for the third time to accomplish the
great cause of national unification.  The two sides may first send people to meet
for an exhaustive exchange of views.
2. It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities on both sides of the strait
to communicate with each other, reunite with their relatives, develop trade and
increase mutual understanding.  We propose that the two sides make
arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mail, trade, air and shipping
services, and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic, cultural, and
sports exchanges, and reach an agreement thereupon.
3. After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as
a special administration region, and it can retain its armed forces.  The central
government will not interfere with local affairs in Taiwan.
4. Taiwan’s current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its way
of life and its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries.  There
will be no encroachment on the proprietary rights and lawful right of
inheritance over private property, houses, land and enterprises, or on foreign
investments.
5. People in authority and representative personages of various circles in Taiwan
may take up posts of leadership in national political bodies and participate in
running the state.
6. When Taiwan’s local finance is in difficulty, the central government may
subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.
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95 Printed in Lasater.
96 As leaked to Steve Lohr, “Taiwan Expresses Regret Over Communique,” New York
Times, August 18, 1982.  James Lilley, as Director of AIT, delivered the “Six Assurances”
in the form of a blind memo with no letterhead or signature to President Chiang Ching-kuo
through a top ROC diplomat, Fredrick Chien, who translated them.  (James Lilley, China
Hands, Public Affairs, 2004.)  Fredrick Chien specified his translated wording in Chinese
in Chien Fu’s Memoirs, Volume II (Taipei, 2005).  Chien wrote the fifth assurance as  “the
United States cannot support the PRC’s position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.”
7. For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in Taiwan
who wish to come and settle on the mainland, it is guaranteed that proper
arrangements will be made for them, that there will be no discrimination
against them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and exit.
8. Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage in
various economic undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights,
interests, and profits are guaranteed.
9. The unification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese.  We
sincerely welcome people of all nationalities, public figures of all circles, and
all mass organizations in Taiwan to make proposals and suggestions regarding
affairs of state through various channels and in various ways.
Taiwan’s return to the embrace of the motherland and the accomplishment of
the great cause of national unification is a great and glorious mission history has
bequeathed on our generation. ...  We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick
to their one-China position and their opposition to “two Chinas” and that they will
put national interests above everything else, forget previous ill will and join hands
with us in accomplishing the great cause of national unification and the great goal
of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our ancestors, bring
benefit to our posterity, and write a new and glorious page in the history of the
Chinese nation!
Letter from President Reagan to Deng Xiaoping.95
April 5, 1982
Clearly, the Taiwan issue had been a most difficult problem between our
governments. ...  The United States firmly adheres to the positions agreed upon in the
Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United
States and China.  There is only one China.  We will not permit the unofficial
relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken our
commitment to this principle.
Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan.96
July 14, 1982
In negotiating a new Communique with the PRC, the United States:
1. Would not set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan;
2. Would not hold prior consultations with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan;
CRS-41
97 Feldman, Harvey, “Reagan’s Commitment to Taiwan: the Real Meaning of the Taiwan
Communique,” Washington Times, April 24, 2001;  “Taiwan, Arms Sales, and the Reagan
Assurances,” American Asian Review, Fall 2001.  According to Feldman, James Lilley,
Director of AIT, delivered a “non-paper” from President Reagan to ROC President Chiang
Ching-kuo, which included this clarification of U.S. commitments.  Lilley delivered this
message in addition to the “Six Assurances” given on July 14, 1982.  Feldman noted to CRS
that he obtained the wording from Chien Fu, then the ROC’s Vice Foreign Minister, who
translated from a Chinese translation of an English text.
98 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan.
99 The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers held hearings on September
17 and 27, 1982, and subsequently communicated with the State Department to investigate
“apparent conflicts” between the Reagan Administration’s 1982 Communique and the TRA,
and to seek clarifications on policy toward Taiwan from Secretary of State George Shultz.
He answered that “a determination of Taiwan’s defense needs and of the sufficiency of its
self-defense capability requires an assessment of the nature of the military threat confronting
it.  This necessarily requires an assessment of the military capacity of the PRC and its policy
towards Taiwan.”  Among extensive responses, Shultz also replied that U.S. arms sales do
not violate China’s sovereignty; that the United States takes no position on the question of
Taiwan’s sovereignty; and that the communique is not an international agreement.
100 The Chinese text says that the United States “recognized” (“cheng ren”) “China’s”
(“zhongguo de”) position, repeating the formulation of the 1979 communique.
3. Would not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing;
4. Would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
5. Has not changed its position regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan;
6. Would not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.
Message from President Reagan to Taiwan President.97
July 26, 1982
I want to point out that this decision [on a joint communique] is based on a
PRC decision only to use peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue.  On this point,
the U.S. will not only pay attention to what the PRC says, but also will use all
methods to achieve surveillance of PRC military production and military deployment.
The intelligence attained would be brought to your attention.  If there is any change
with regard to their commitment to peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, the U.S.
commitments would become invalidated.
U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales (1982 Communique).98
August 17, 198299
In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on
January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America
recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal
government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position100 that there is but
one China and Taiwan is part of China.  
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101 In response to a question at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing of March
25, 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth cited this phrase as a precedent for
President Clinton’s June 1998 statement in China that the United States does not support
Taiwan independence, as part of the “Three Noes.”
102 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was an unresolved issue.  James Lilley wrote that President
Reagan refused to end arms sales, while he agreed to concede a limit on such sales.  The
final wording vaguely referred to a “final resolution” of the issue.  (See: James Lilley, China
Hands, Public Affairs: 2004.)  Later, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236, enacted on April 30, 1994), affirming that Sec.
3 of the TRA (on arms sales) takes primacy over policy statements (1982 Joint
Communique), among other stipulations.
The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course
of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations.
The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China’s
internal affair.  The Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on
January 1, 1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful
unification of the Motherland.  The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on
September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy
to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.
The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with
China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty
and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a
policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”101 The United States
Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China’s Message to
Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point Proposal put
forward by China on September 30, 1981.  The new situation which has emerged
with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the
settlement of United States-China differences over the question of United States arms
sales to Taiwan.
Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States
Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales
to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment
of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to
reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final
resolution.  In so stating, the United States acknowledges China’s consistent position
regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.102
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103 “Statement on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan,” August 17, 1982, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan.
104 First publicly disclosed by James Mann, in About Face (Alfred Knopf, 1999).  According
to Mann, President Reagan’s secret memorandum (on the August 17, 1982 communique)
clarified U.S. policy as maintaining the military balance between the PRC and Taiwan.  A
version of the text, as provided by an unnamed former U.S. official, was published in Robert
Kaiser, “What We Said, What They Said, What’s Unsaid,” Washington Post, April 15,
2001.  According to Alan Romberg’s Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice (Stimson Center,
2003), Charles Hill, then Executive Secretary of the State Department, confirmed that
Secretary of State George Shultz was told by President Reagan that his intention was to
solidify the stress on a peaceful resolution and the importance of maintaining the cross-strait
military balance for that objective.  Reagan also intended his written clarification to reassure
Republicans in Congress, such as Senator Jesse Helms, that Taiwan would not be
disadvantaged by the communique.  Partial text of the memo was published by James Lilley,
in China Hands (Public Affairs, 2004).
105 Harding.
President Reagan’s Statement on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan.103
August 17, 1982
Regarding future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set forth clearly in the
communique [issued on the same day], is fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations
Act.  Arms sales will continue in accordance with the act and with the full
expectation that the approach of the Chinese Government to the resolution of the
Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful.  We attach great significance to the
Chinese statement in the communique regarding China’s “fundamental” policy, and
it is clear from our statements that our future actions will be conducted with this
peaceful policy fully in mind.  The position of the United States Government has
always been clear and consistent in this regard.  The Taiwan question is a matter for
the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.  We will not
interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people
of Taiwan in this matter.  At the same time, we have an abiding interest and concern
that any resolution be peaceful.  I shall never waver from this fundamental position.
Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communique.104
The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned
absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the
Taiwan-PRC differences.  It should be clearly understood that the linkage between
these two matters is a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.  In addition, it
is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned
entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.  Both in quantitative and qualitative terms,
Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.
PRC’s Statement on the Communique.105
August 17, 1982
In the joint communique, the Chinese Government reiterates in clear-cut terms
its position that “the question of Taiwan is China’s internal affair.”  The U.S. side
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106 U.S. House,  Committee on Foreign Affairs,  Hearing on China-Taiwan: United States
Policy, “Prepared Statement of John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs,” August 18, 1982.
also indicates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and
territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy
of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”
Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge and “Six Assurances”.106
August 18, 1982
[On the August 17, 1982, communique], let me recapitulate and emphasize a
few key features; then I’ll take your questions.  First, the document must be read as
a whole, since the policies it sets forth are interrelated [original emphasis]. 
Second, as I have previously noted, the communique contains a strong Chinese
statement that its fundamental policy is to seek to resolve the Taiwan question by
peaceful means (Para 4) [original emphasis]. ...
Third, the U.S. statements concerning future arms sales to Taiwan (Para 6)
are based on China’s statements as to its fundamental peaceful policy for seeking
a resolution to the Taiwan question and on the “new situation” created by those
statements (Para 5) [original emphasis]. ...
Fourth, we did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan
and the statements of future U.S. arms sales policy embodied in the Communique do
not provide either a time frame for reductions of U.S. arms sales or for their
termination. ...We see no mediation role for the U.S. nor will we attempt to exert
pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.  ...  There has been no
change in our long-standing position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan.  The
communique (Para 1) in its opening paragraph simply cites that portion of the joint
communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the
P.R.C. in which the U.S. “acknowledged the Chinese position on this issue” (i.e.,
that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China). ...  It has been reported
in the press that the Chinese at one point suggested that the Taiwan Relations Act
be revised.  We have no plans to seek any such revisions. ... [Para 9] should not be
read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on
arms sales to Taiwan.  [original emphasis]
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107 Deng’s talk on “A New Way to Stabilize the World Situation,” translated from Deng
Xiaoping Lun Guofang He Jundui Jianshe [Deng Xiaoping Discusses National Defense and
Military Construction], Junshi Kexue Chubanshe [Military Science Press], May 1992.
During PRC-British talks on the future of Hong Kong, Deng conveyed his proposal for a
“one country, two systems” formula in a meeting with former U.S. National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who visited China as part of a delegation from Georgetown
University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies.  The meeting and Deng’s
decision of “effecting two systems within one country” was reported in Wen Wei Po (a PRC
newspaper in Hong Kong), February 24, 1984; translated in FBIS, February 28, 1984.
Deng’s formula has been often translated as “one country, two systems,” rather than “one
China, two systems.”
108 Mann (p. 153-154) writes that after the conclusion of negotiations over Hong Kong, Deng
launched a secret, intensive effort to settle with the Reagan Administration on the future of
Taiwan.  When British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher signed the Hong Kong agreement
in December 1984, Deng passed a message through her to Reagan, asking that the same
formula of “one country, two systems” be applied to Taiwan.  However, the message was
not conveyed, but some Americans lobbied for the proposal.  In the end, the Administration
decided not to settle on Taiwan’s future.
109 Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush.
PRC Leader Deng Xiaoping on “One China, Two Systems”.107
February 22, 1984
There are many disputes in the world that always require solutions.  I have had
the belief for many years that, no matter what solutions are used to solve these
problems, don’t use means of war, but use peaceful ways.  Our proposal for
unification between the mainland and Taiwan is fair and reasonable.  After
unification, Taiwan will still be allowed to engage in its capitalism, while the
mainland implements socialism, but there will be one unified China.  One China, two
systems.  The Hong Kong problem will also be treated the same: one China, two
systems.108
Statements During George H. W. Bush Administration
Toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing.109
February 25, 1989
We remain firmly committed to the principles set forth in those three joint
communiques that form the basis of our relationship.  And based on the bedrock
principle that there is but one China, we have found ways to address Taiwan
constructively without rancor.  We Americans have a long, historical friendship with
Chinese people everywhere.  In the last few years, we’ve seen an encouraging
expansion of family contacts and travel and indirect trade and other forms of
peaceful interchange across the Taiwan Strait, reflecting the interests of the Chinese
people themselves.  And this trend, this new environment, is consistent with
America’s present and longstanding interest in a peaceful resolution of the
differences by the Chinese themselves.
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110 Text published in: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China,
“Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations,”
February 1997.  The Guidelines were adopted by the National Unification Council on
February 23, 1991, and by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) on March 14, 1991.  These
guidelines asserted the principle of “one China, two political entities,” recognized the PRC’s
jurisdiction over the mainland, and called for eventual unification on the basis on “parity”
between the two sides.  Then, on May 1, 1991,  Taiwan terminated the 1948 National
Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, thus ending the civil war against
the Communists and recognizing the political authority of the PRC on the mainland.
111 Text published in: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China,
“Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations,”
February 1997.   “The Meaning of `One China’” was adopted by the National Unification
Council.
112 Remarks to General Dynamics Employees in Fort Worth, Texas, September 2, 1992,
Administration of George Bush, 1992 (Public Papers of the Presidents).  In addition to this
arms sale decision, the Bush Administration also broke new ground in high-level exchanges
with Taiwan.  In Taiwan from November 30-December 3, 1992, U.S. Trade Representative
Carla Hills was the first U.S. cabinet official to visit since de-recognition in 1979.
Taiwan’s Guidelines for National Unification.110
March 14, 1991
[Unification is] to establish a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous
China. ...  It should be achieved in gradual phases under the principles of reason,
peace, parity, and reciprocity. ...   [In the short term,] to enhance understanding
through exchanges between the two sides of the Strait and eliminate hostility through
reciprocity; and to establish a mutually benign relationship by not endangering each
other’s security and stability while in the midst of exchanges and not denying the
other’s existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting reciprocity.
Taiwan on the Meaning of “One China”.111
August 1, 1992
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China.  However,
the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of “one China.”
To Peking, “one China” means the “People’s Republic of China (PRC),” with
Taiwan to become a “Special Administration Region” after unification.  Taipei, on
the other hand, considers “one China” to mean the Republic of China (ROC),
founded in 1911 and with de jure sovereignty over all of China.  The ROC, however,
currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.  Taiwan
is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well.
President Bush on the Sale of F-16s to Taiwan.112
September 2, 1992
I’m announcing this afternoon that I will authorize the sale to Taiwan of 150
F-16A/B aircraft, made right here in Fort Worth. ...  This sale of F-16s to Taiwan
will help maintain peace and stability in an area of great concern to us, the Asia-
Pacific region, in conformity with our law.  In the last few years, after decades of
confrontation, great strides have been made in reducing tensions between Taipei and
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113 Beijing’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taipei’s
Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) met semi-officially in Hong Kong, October 28-30, 1992.
The PRC and KMT politicians in Taiwan have argued that the two sides reached a
“consensus” on the “one China” principle.  The DPP and President Chen Shui-bian have
disagreed.  On August 28, 2001, AIT Director Raymond Burghardt said that the two sides
had exchanged faxes which constituted an agreement to hold talks, adding “I’m not sure why
you could call that a consensus.  I call it an agreement.”  In his National Day address of
October 10, 2004, Chen suggested that the 1992 “meeting” be the basis to resume dialogue.
114 Press release in Chinese by the SEF, Taipei, November 3, 1992, printed in a book by a
KMT politician: Su Chi, The Historical Record of the Consensus of “One China, Different
Interpretations” (Taipei: National Policy Foundation, 2002).  Also reported in “Strait Group
Agrees to State Positions ‘Orally’,” Central News Agency, Taipei, November 18, 1992.
115 Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], Beijing, November 6, 1992.  ARATS sent a letter to the
SEF on November 16, 1992, reiterating this agreement.  The letter also stated that “both
sides of the strait support the one China principle and seek national unification.  However,
negotiations on routine matters across the strait do not involve the political meaning of ‘one
China’.”  The letter in Chinese is printed in a book by a KMT politician: Su Chi, The
Historical Record of the Consensus of “One China, Different Interpretations” (Taipei:
National Policy Foundation, 2002).  Also reported in Renmin Ribao, November 21, 1992.
Beijing.  During this period, the United States has provided Taiwan with sufficient
defensive capabilities to sustain the confidence it needs to reduce those tensions.
That same sense of security has underpinned Taiwan’s dramatic evolution toward
democracy.  
My decision today does not change the commitment of this Administration and
its predecessors to the three communiques with the People’s Republic of China.  We
keep our word: our one-China policy, our recognition of the PRC as the sole
legitimate government of China.  I’ve always stressed that the importance of the
1982 communique on arms sales to Taiwan lies in its promotion of common political
goals: peace and stability in the area through mutual restraint.
Beijing and Taipei Agree to Verbally Disagree on “One China”.
November 3, 1992
“One China, Different Interpretations” or “1992 Consensus on One China”113
Taipei’s SEF: On November 3, a responsible person of the Communist Chinese
ARATS said that it is willing to “respect and accept” SEF’s proposal that each side
“verbally states” its respective principles on “one China.”114
Beijing’s ARATS: At this working-level consultation in Hong Kong, SEF
representatives suggested that each side use respective verbal announcements to
state the one China principle.  On November 3rd, SEF sent a letter, formally
notifying that “each side will make respective statements through verbal
announcements.”  ARATS fully respects and accepts SEF’s suggestion.115
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116 PRC Premier Li Peng, Government Work Report to the First Session of the 8th National
People’s Congress, Beijing, Central Television Program, March 15, 1993; translated in
FBIS, March 15, 1993.  According to analysis by FBIS Trends (March 31, 1993), by saying
“both sides” (not the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party), Li changed the
formulation in his report from previous years, signaling greater PRC concern about pro-
independence activities in Taiwan and urgency to hold unification talks, “as soon as
possible.”  The analysis also noted that, when warning of “all necessary drastic measures,”
Li echoed the “unusually harsh language” used by General Secretary Jiang Zemin in
December 1992.  According to Beijing Review (January 4-10, 1993), Jiang warned that
Beijing would take “resolute measures” to prevent Taiwan independence, while reiterating
a policy of peaceful unification.
117 PRC concern apparently increased after the first fully democratic legislative election was
held in Taiwan on December 19, 1992.  The ruling Nationalist Party won 96 out of 161
seats, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained 50 seats.  The DPP has
advocated a “Republic of Taiwan,” instead of “Republic of China.” 
118 Mainland Chinese and Taiwan authorities held their first talks and signed their first
agreements since 1949.  Represented by “authorized nongovernmental organizations,” the
PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF) met in Singapore and agreed to institutionalize contacts.
ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan and SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu agreed that the talks
were not political, but were nongovernmental, economic, practical, and functional.
119 Xinhua (New China News Agency), Beijing, April 27, 1993, translated in FBIS, April 27,
(continued...)
Statements During Clinton Administration
PRC Premier Li Peng Warns Taiwan.116
March 15, 1993117
We advocate that both sides hold talks as soon as possible on bringing hostility
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to an end and gradually fulfilling peaceful
unification. ...  The forces advocating Taiwan independence on and off the island
have resurged in recent years.  Certain international forces have also deliberately
created obstacles to impede China’s peaceful unification.  They cannot but arouse
serious concern by the Chinese Government and all the Chinese people.  We are
resolutely opposed to any form of two China’s or one China and one Taiwan; and
we will take all necessary drastic measures to stop any activities aimed at making
Taiwan independent and splitting the motherland.
Mainland-Taiwan “Koo-Wang” Talks (Singapore).118
April 27-29, 1993
PRC (Wang Daohan): There are many questions that need to be solved because
contacts between the two sides of the strait began only after a separation of more
than 40 years.  We have said repeatedly that as long as both sides sit down to talk,
we can discuss any question.  Proper methods for solving problems will be found as
long as the two organizations observe the spirit of mutual respect, consult on equal





120 Dr. Koo’s Arrival Address at Singapore Airport, April 26, 1993, “A Resume of the Koo-
Wang Talks,” Straits Exchange Foundation, December 1993.
121 Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, “Our Views on the Koo-Wang Talks,” May 1993.
122 Jason Hu, Director General of the ROC’s Government Information Office, “The Case For
Taipei’s U.N. Representation,” speech at the Atlantic Council on September 17, 1993.  See
also, Fredrick F. Chien, (ROC Foreign Minister), “UN Should Welcome Taiwan,” Far
Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 1993; “Divided China in the United Nations: Time for
Parallel Representation” (advertisement), New York Times, September 17, 1993.  According
to Hu, Taiwan’s bid was submitted in a letter sent by seven South American countries to the
U.N. Secretary General on August 6, 1993.  He also said that the bid included flexibility on
the name to use at the U.N.
123 On April 27-29, 1993, the landmark “Koo-Wang” talks had been held in Singapore
between Koo Chen-fu (chairman of Taiwan’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF)) and Wang
Daohan (chairman of the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
(ARATS)), the first meeting between the heads of the two organs set up for cross-strait
dialogue.  Later in 1993, according to Mann (p. 290), the State Department drafted a policy
review to restore high-level dialogue with Beijing and submitted it to the White House in
July 1993.  As part of the new policy of engagement toward China, President Clinton invited
PRC President Jiang Zemin to attend the first summit of leaders in the Asia Pacific
Economic (APEC) Forum in Seattle, Washington, in November 1993.  The Far Eastern
Economic Review (October 7, 1993) reported that Taipei was unhappy that Washington
agreed with Beijing that Taiwan, despite its status in APEC equal to other members, would
not be represented by Lee Teng-hui, but by Vincent Siew, head of economic planning.
Taiwan (Koo Chen-fu): There exist not only the same geographical, historical,
and cultural origins between the two sides, but also a “blood is thicker than water”
sentiment shared by our people.  President Lee Teng-hui’s proclamation that:
“Taiwan’s relationship with the entire Chinese people cannot be severed” could not
have said it more clearly.120
Taiwan:  The subjects discussed in the Koo-Wang Talks were planned by the
government in accord with the goals of the short-term phase in the Guidelines for
National Unification. ...  The Koo-Wang Talks were obviously in no way political.
... During the talks, SEF delegates steadfastly upheld the principle of parity in such
matters as meeting procedures, conference site, seating, as well as the topics and
scope of discussion.  This made it impossible for the other side to slight the fact that
the ROC is an equal political entity.121
Taiwan’s Bid to Gain Parallel Representation at the U.N.122
August-September 1993123
[In 1991], we accepted the fact that the nation was divided and that, prior to
the unification of China, the political authority of both the ROC government and the
Chinese communists exist.  Both the ROC government and the Chinese communists
exercise political authority in the areas under their de facto control.  Each is entitled
to represent the residents of the territory under its de facto control and to participate
in the activities of the international community. ...  It is now the fixed policy and goal
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124 “The Taiwan Question and the Unification of China,” Xinhua [New China News
Agency],  August 31, 1993, translated in FBIS, September 1, 1993.
125 Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan (Cabinet), Republic of China, “Explanation
of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait,” July 5, 1994, translated in FBIS, July 11, 1994.
of the government and the opposition parties in the ROC to participate in the United
Nations. ...
PRC’s White Paper on Taiwan.124
August 31, 1993
There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China,
and the seat of China’s central government is in Beijing.  This is a universally
recognized fact as well as the premise for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question.  The Chinese government is firmly against any words or deeds designed to
split China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  It opposes “two Chinas,” “one
China, one Taiwan,” “one country, two governments,” or any attempt or act that
could lead to “independence of Taiwan.”  The Chinese people on both sides of the
strait all believe that there is only one China and espouse national unification.
Taiwan’s status as an inalienable part of China has been determined and cannot be
changed.  “Self-determination” for Taiwan is out of the question.
Peaceful unification is a set policy of the Chinese Government.  However, any
sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military
ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity.  The Chinese Government is
under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or people
intending to split China as to what means it might use to handle its own domestic
affairs.
It should be pointed out that the Taiwan question is purely an internal affair of
China and bears no analogy to the cases of Germany and Korea which were brought
about as a result of international accords at the end of the Second World War.
Taiwan’s White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations.125
July 5, 1994
It is an incontrovertible historical fact that the ROC has always been an
independent sovereign state in the international community since its founding in
1912.  However, relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not those
between two separate countries, neither are they purely domestic in nature.  In order
to ensure that cross-strait relations develop toward benign interaction, the ROC
government has formulated the concept of a “political entity” to serve as the basis
of interaction between the two sides.  The term “political entity” has extensive
meaning, it can refer to a country, a government, or a political organization.  At the
current stage of cross-Strait interaction, only when we set aside the “sovereignty
dispute” will we untie the knots that have bound us for more than the past  40 years
and progress smoothly toward unification. ...
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The ROC Government is firm in its advocacy of “one China” and is opposed
to “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”  But at the same time, given that
division and divided rule on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is a long-standing
political fact, the ROC Government also holds that the two sides should be fully
aware that each has jurisdiction over its respective territory and that they should
coexist as two legal entities in the international arena.  As for their relationship with
each other, it is that of two separate areas of one China and is therefore “domestic”
or “Chinese” in nature. ...
The ROC Government takes “one China, two equal political entities” as the
structure for handling cross-strait relations and hopes that cross-strait relations will
develop in the direction of being peaceful, pragmatic, and sensible. ..  The CPC
[Communist Party of China] should dismiss any misgivings it has concerning the
ROC Government’s determination to achieve unification.  What the CPC authorities
should give urgent consideration to is how, given the fact that the country is divided
under two separate governments, we can actively create favorable conditions for
unification and gradually bring the two different “political entities” together to form
“one China.” ...  At the same time, the Chinese people cannot strive for unification
just for the sake of unification; instead, unification should be realized under a
reasonable and benign political, economic, and social system and way of living.
Therefore, we hold that the two sides of the strait should go all out to build a
democratic, free, equally wealthy, and united China. ...
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126 Announced on September 7, 1994 and described in the Clinton Administration’s only
public statement on the Taiwan Policy Review, which was given by Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, “Taiwan Policy Review,” Testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 27, 1994 (in U.S. Department
of State Dispatch, October 17, 1994).  Lord noted that “the lengthy, detailed inter-agency
policy review that we have conducted is the first of its kind launched by any Administration
of either political party since we shifted recognition to Beijing in 1979.”  While opposing
legislation to specifically allow visits by top leaders of Taiwan, the Administration decided
to send high-level economic and technical officials to visit Taiwan, establish a sub-cabinet
level economic dialogue with Taiwan, allow Taiwan’s office in the United States to change
its name to Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), and support
Taiwan’s membership in international organizations where statehood is not a requirement
and Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not allowed.
127 The review came after the Congress passed and the President signed (on April 30, 1994)
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) which
directed the State Department to register foreign-born Taiwanese-Americans as U.S. citizens
born in Taiwan (rather than China); called for the President to send Cabinet-level officials
to Taiwan and to show clear U.S. support for Taiwan in bilateral and multilateral
relationships; and declared that Sec. 3 of the TRA (on arms sales) takes primacy over
statements of U.S. policy (the 1982 communique).  In addition, in May 1994, the State
Department had allowed Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to make a refueling stop in Hawaii
but denied him a visa to enter the United States.  In response, the Senate, from July to
October, passed amendments introduced by Senator Brown to ensure that Taiwan’s
President can enter the United States on certain occasions.  Two amendments (for S. 2182
and H.R. 4606) that passed were not retained, but the amendment to the Immigration and
Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 was enacted.  Upon signing the bill into law
(P.L. 103-416) on October 25, 1994, President Clinton, nonetheless, said that he would
construe Sec. 221 as expressing Congress’ view.
Washington’s Taiwan Policy Review.126
September 7, 1994127
U.S. policy toward Taiwan is governed, of course, by the Taiwan Relations Act
of 1979.  Three communiques with the People’s Republic of China (the Shanghai
Communique of 1972, the Normalization Communique of 1979, and the Joint
Communique of 1982) also constitute part of the foundation.  In the joint
communique shifting diplomatic relations to the PRC 15 years ago, the United States
recognized “the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal
Government of China.”  The document further states that “Within this context, the
people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial
relations with the people of Taiwan.”  The United States also acknowledged “the
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”  These
formulations were repeated in the 1982 communique.  Since 1978, each
Administration has reaffirmed this policy.
The policy has been essential in maintaining peace, stability, and economic
development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and throughout the region. ...  We
have made absolutely clear our expectation that cross-strait relations will evolve in
a peaceful manner.  We neither interfere in nor mediate this process.  But we
welcome any evolution in relations between Taipei and Beijing that is mutually
agreed upon and peacefully reached. ...
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128 Jiang Zemin, “Continue to Promote the Unification of the Motherland,” January 30,
1995.  As part of the context of his speech, Jiang looked to the 100th anniversary of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed between China and Japan on April 17, 1895, which ceded
Taiwan to Japan as a colony until the end of World War Two.  Jiang also cited the transfer
of control to the PRC of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999, and said that “now it is
high time to accomplish the unification of the motherland.”
In the end, it is only the two parties themselves, Taiwan and the PRC, that will
be able to resolve the issues between them.  In this regard, the United States
applauds the continuing progress in cross-strait dialogue. ...
We will continue to provide material and training to Taiwan to enable it to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as mandated by the Taiwan Relations
Act. ...
Within this framework, the President has decided to enhance our unofficial ties
with Taiwan. ...  the Administration strongly opposes Congressional attempts to
legislate visits by top leaders of the “Republic of China” to the U.S. ...
Recognizing Taiwan’s important role in transnational issues, we will support
its membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite, and will
support opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations where its
membership is not possible.
We do not seek and cannot impose a resolution of differences between Taiwan
and the People’s Republic of China.  Nor should we permit one to manipulate us
against the other.
PRC President Jiang Zemin’s “Eight Points”.128
January 30, 1995
1. We must firmly oppose any words or actions aimed at creating an “independent
Taiwan” and the propositions “split the country and rule under separate
regimes,” two Chinas over a certain period of time,” etc., which are in
contravention of the principle of one China.
2. We do not challenge the development of non-governmental economic and
cultural ties by Taiwan with other countries. ...  However, we oppose Taiwan’s
activities in “expanding its living space internationally,” which are aimed at
creating “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” ...  
3. It has been our consistent stand to hold negotiations with the Taiwan
authorities on the peaceful unification of the motherland. ...  I suggest that, as
the first step, negotiations should be held and an agreement reached on
officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides in accordance with
the principle that there is only one China. ...
4. We should strive for the peaceful unification of the motherland, since Chinese
should not fight fellow Chinese.  Our not undertaking to give up the use of force
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129 Lee Teng-hui, “Address to the National Unification Council,” April 8, 1995.
is not directed against our compatriots in Taiwan but against the schemes of
foreign forces to interfere with China’s unification and to bring about the
“independence of Taiwan.” ...
5. Great efforts should be made to expand the economic exchanges and
cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait...
6. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should inherit and carry forward the
fine traditions of Chinese culture.
7. The 21 million compatriots in Taiwan, whether born there or in other
provinces, are all Chinese...  We also hope that all political parties in Taiwan
will adopt a sensible, forward-looking, and constructive attitude and promote
the expansion of relations between the two sides. ...
8. Leaders of Taiwan authorities are welcome to pay visits in appropriate
capacities.  We are also ready to accept invitations from the Taiwan side to visit
Taiwan. ...  The affairs of the Chinese people should be handled by ourselves,
something that does not take an international occasion to accomplish. ...
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s “Six Point” Response.129
April 8, 1995
1. The fact that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have been ruled by two political
entities in no way subordinate to each other had led to a state of division between the
two sides and separate governmental jurisdictions, hence, the issue of national
unification. ...  Only by facing up to this reality can both sides build greater
consensus on the “one China” issue and at the earliest possible date.
2. In Taiwan, we have long taken upon ourselves the responsibility for
safeguarding and furthering traditional Chinese culture, and advocate that culture
be the basis for exchanges between both sides to help promote the nationalistic
sentiment for living together in prosperity and to foster a strong sense of
brotherliness. ...
3. We will continue to assist the mainland in developing its economy and
upgrading the living standards of its people based upon our existing investments and
trade relations.  As for trade and transportation links with the mainland, the
agencies concerned have to make in-depth evaluations as well as careful plans since
these are very complicated issues. ...
4. I have indicated on several occasions that if leaders on both sides could meet
with each other on international occasions in a natural manner, this would alleviate
the political confrontation between both sides and foster a harmonious atmosphere
for developing future relations. ...  It is our firm belief that the more international
organizations both sides join on an equal footing, the more favorable the
CRS-55
130 Department of State’s announcement by spokesperson, Nicholas Burns, May 22, 1995.
Congress’ view was an important factor acknowledged by the Administration in its reversal
of policy to grant the visa.  Congress had overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan H.Con.Res.
53 expressing the sense of Congress that the President should promptly welcome a visit by
Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater, Cornell University, and a transit stop in Anchorage, Alaska,
to attend a conference.  The House passed the resolution by 396-0 on May 2, and the Senate
passed it by 97-1 on May 9, 1995.  Some analysts believe that another factor was the
contrast posed by the Administration’s March 1995 decision to grant visits to Gerry Adams
(leader of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA)), to the United
States, including meetings with Clinton in the White House — despite objections from
London.
environment will become for the growth of bilateral relations and for the process of
peaceful unification. ...
5. We believe the mainland authorities should demonstrate their goodwill by
publicly renouncing the use of force and refrain from making any military move that
might arouse anxiety or suspicion on this side of the Taiwan Strait, thus paving the
way for formal negotiations between both sides to put an end to the state of hostility.
...
6. Hong Kong and Macau are integral parts of the Chinese nation ...  Post-1997
Hong Kong and post-1999 Macau are naturally a matter of great concern to us.  In
this regard, the ROC government has reiterated its determination to maintain normal
contact with Hong Kong and Macau, further participate in affairs related to Hong
Kong and Macau, and provide better services to our compatriots there. ...
U.S. Visa For Lee Teng-hui’s Private Visit to Cornell University.130
May 22, 1995
President Clinton has decided to permit Lee Teng-hui to make a private visit to
the United States in June for the express purpose of participating in an alumni
reunion event at Cornell University, as a distinguished alumnus.  The action follows
a revision of Administration guidelines to permit occasional private visits by senior
leaders of Taiwan, including President Lee.
President Lee will visit the U.S. in a strictly private capacity and will not
undertake any official activities.  It is important to reiterate that this is not an official
visit.  The granting of a visa in this case is consistent with U.S. policy of maintaining
only unofficial relations with Taiwan.  It does not convey any change in our relations
with or policies towards the People’s Republic of China, with which we maintain
official relations and recognize as the sole legal government of China.
We will continue to abide by the three communiques that form the basis of our
relations with China.  The United States also acknowledges the Chinese position that
there is but one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. ...
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131 Garver, p. 79; Mann, p. 330.  These promises apparently formed the basis for the
Administration’s later public statements issued in 1997 and 1998, including one by
President Clinton in China, that became known as the “Three Noes.”  However, “opposing”
Taiwan independence was changed to a more neutral stance of “not supporting” it.
Clinton’s letter was sent after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched its first test-
firing of M-9 short-range ballistic missiles toward Taiwan in July 1995, as part of the PRC’s
reaction to Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University in June 1995.
132 Department of State, Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on East
Asia and the Pacific, March 14, 1996.  The PRC followed its July 1995 missile test-firings
with more military exercises and additional missile test-firings in March 1996 — to
intimidate voters in Taiwan on the eve of their first democratic presidential election.  After
introduction of H.Con.Res. 148 on March 7, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced
on March 10 and 11 the decisions to deploy two carrier battle groups east of Taiwan to
underscore the American commitment to regional peace and stability.  However, the
Administration did not agree with Congress on the need to formally consult with Congress
on the U.S. response to the PLA actions, under Section 3(c) of the TRA.
Clinton’s Secret Letter to Jiang Zemin and “Three Noes”.131
August 1995
At a meeting in Brunei in August 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
reportedly delivered a letter from President Clinton to Chinese President Jiang
Zemin.  In the letter, which has not been made public, Clinton is said to have assured
Jiang that the United States would (1) “oppose” Taiwan independence; (2) would not
support “two Chinas,” or one China and one Taiwan; and (3) would not support
Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations. 
U.S. Department of State and March 1996 Taiwan Strait Tensions.132
March 14, 1996
Our fundamental interest on the Taiwan question is that peace and stability be
maintained and that the PRC and Taiwan work out their differences peacefully.   At
the same time, we will strictly avoid interfering as the two sides pursue peaceful
resolution of differences. 
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 forms the legal basis of U.S. policy
regarding the security of Taiwan. ...  However serious, the present situation does not
constitute a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude contemplated by the drafters of the
Taiwan Relations Act.  The PRC pressure against Taiwan to date does not add up
to a “threat to the security or the social or economic system” of Taiwan. ...We will
continue to work closely with you, and if warranted by circumstances, we will act
under Section 3(c) of the TRA, in close consultation with the Congress.
Overall U.S. China policy, including the Taiwan question, is expressed in the
three joint communiques with the PRC as follows:
 — The United States recognizes the Government of the PRC as “the sole legal
Government of China.”
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133 “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan in
Tokyo,” April 17, 1996, Public Papers of United States Presidents, William Clinton.  The
two leaders issued a Joint Declaration on Security to strengthen the alliance.
134 Department of State, “American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship,” Address by
Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign
Relations, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, May 17, 1996.
Christopher ended with a signal of President Clinton’s new willingness to hold regular
summits with the PRC President.  Then in July 1996, National Security Advisor Anthony
Lake traveled to China to pursue the “strategic dialogue.” Briefing reporters on July 3, 1996,
a  National Security Council official said Lake was scheduled to meet Wang Daohan,
chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), in order to
do “what we can there to advance the resumption and to promote the resumption of cross-
strait dialogue and to reinforce our position that the differences between Taiwan and China
need to be resolved peacefully.”  This item on Lake’s agenda signaled a new, proactive U.S.
stance on cross-strait relations and raised questions in Beijing and Taipei of U.S.
involvement.  The meeting was canceled after Lake’s arrival in China.  
 — The U.S. acknowledges the Chinese position that “there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China.”  In 1982, the U.S. assured the PRC that it has no
intention of pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”
 — Within this context, the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural, commercial,
and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
 — The U.S. has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to
be worked out peacefully by the Chinese themselves.
President Clinton’s Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister.133
April 17, 1996
Clinton:  Yes, we discussed Taiwan and China extensively, as well as the recent
tension in the strait.  It is obvious that our partnership is designed to try to preserve
the peace for all peoples in this region.  And I believe that I can say we both agree
that, while the United States clearly observes the so-called one China policy, we also
observe the other aspects of the agreement we made many years ago, which include
a commitment on the part of both parties to resolve all their differences in a
peaceable manner.  And we have encouraged them to pursue that.  Therefore, we
were concerned about those actions in the Taiwan Strait.
Secretary of State Christopher on Relations with China.134
May 17, 1996
Since 1972, the foundation for deepening engagement between our nations has
been the “one China” policy that is embodied in the three joint communiques
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. ...
The United States strongly believes that resolution of the issues between the
PRC and Taiwan must be peaceful.  We were gravely concerned when China’s
military exercises two months ago raised tensions in the Taiwan Strait.  Our
deployment of naval forces to the region was meant to avert any dangerous
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135 “The President [Lee Teng-hui’s] Inaugural Speech (Excerpt),”May 20, 1996, printed in
Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations,
Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, February 1997.  With a tense
military environment brought by China’s military exercises that included missile test-firings,
Lee Teng-hui won a landslide victory of 54 percent of the votes in Taiwan’s first democratic
presidential election on March 23, 1996.  Pro-independence candidate Peng Ming-min
received 21 percent, and pro-unification Lin Yang-kang won 15 percent of the votes.
miscalculations.  We are encouraged that both sides have now taken steps to reduce
tensions.
On the eve of the inauguration next Monday of Taiwan’s first democratically
elected President, it is timely to reflect on the enduring value of our “one China”
policy for both the PRC and Taiwan   and on our common interest and responsibility
to uphold it.  I want to tell you publicly today what we have been saying privately to
the leaders in Beijing and Taipei in recent weeks.
To the leadership in Beijing, we have reiterated our consistent position that the
future relationship between Taiwan and the PRC must be resolved directly between
them.  But we have reaffirmed that we have a strong interest in the region’s
continued peace and stability   and that our “one China” policy is predicated on the
PRC’s pursuit of a peaceful resolution of issues between Taipei and Beijing.
To the leadership in Taiwan, we have reiterated our commitment to robust
unofficial relations, including helping Taiwan maintain a sufficient self-defense
capacity under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act.  We have stressed that Taiwan
has prospered under the “one China” policy.  And we have made clear our view that
as Taiwan seeks an international role, it should pursue that objective in a way that
is consistent with a “one China” policy.
We have emphasized to both sides the importance of avoiding provocative
actions or unilateral measures that would alter the status quo or pose a threat to
peaceful resolution of outstanding issues.  And we have strongly urged both sides to
resume the cross-strait dialogue that was interrupted last summer.
Taiwan’s First Direct Presidential Election and Inaugural Address.135
May 20, 1996
The Republic of China has always been a sovereign state.  Disputes across the
Strait center around system and lifestyle; they have nothing to do with ethnic or
cultural identity.  Here in this country, it is totally unnecessary or impossible to
adopt the so-called course of “Taiwan independence.”  For over 40 years, the two
sides of the Strait have been two separate jurisdictions due to various historical
factors, but it is also true that both sides pursue eventual national unification. ...
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136 Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations,
Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, February 1997.  Also see
CRS Report 97-268, Taiwan’s National Development Conference: Proposed Policy
Changes and Implications for the United States, February 24, 1997, by Robert G. Sutter.
Called by President Lee Teng-hui in his inaugural speech in May 1996, delegates from the
three major political parties (Nationalist Party, Democratic Progressive Party, and New
China Party) attended the conference.  The conference took place as Taiwan looked to the
transfer of Hong Kong as a British colony to a Special Administration Region of the PRC
in July 1997.
Taiwan’s Multi-Party National Development Conference.136
December 23-28, 1996
The Republic of China has been a sovereign state since 1912.  Following the
establishment of the Chinese communist regime in 1949, both sides of the Taiwan
Strait became co-equal political entities. ...
The development of relations with the mainland must be based on safeguarding
the survival and development of the Republic of China. ...
The Republic of China is a sovereign state that must actively promote foreign
relations and raise its profile at international activities in its pursuit of national
survival and development.  Taiwan is not a part of the “People’s Republic of China,”
and the ROC government opposes dealing with the cross-strait issue through the
“one country, two systems” scheme.
The government should reduce the possibility of confrontation with the
mainland by establishing sound mainland policies, and should actively make use of
regional and global security and cooperation mechanisms to assure the security of
Taiwan.
At this point, ROC accession to such international bodies as the World Trade
Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, should
continue to be actively pursued.
ROC admission to the United Nations should be actively pursued as a long-term
objective through flexible responses to changes in the international situation.
President Clinton’s Statements at the 1997 Summit (Washington).
October 29, 1997
A key to Asia’s stability is a peaceful and prosperous relationship between the
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.  I reiterated America’s longstanding
commitment to a one China policy.  It has allowed democracy to flourish in Taiwan
and provides a framework in which all three relationships can prosper — between
the United States and the PRC, the United States and Taiwan, and Taiwan and the
People’s Republic of China.  I told President Jiang that we hope the People’s
Republic and Taiwan would resume a constructive cross-strait dialogue and expand
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137 President Clinton’s opening statement, Press Conference by President Clinton and
President Jiang Zemin, Old Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C., October 29, 1997.
138 President Clinton’s answer to a question about whether he sees any U.S. role in securing
a permanent peaceful environment in the Taiwan Strait (after reference to U.S. roles in
brokering peace in Bosnia and the Middle East), Press Conference by President Clinton and
President Jiang Zemin, Old Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C., October 29, 1997.
139 White House, “Joint U.S.-China Statement,” October 29, 1997.  In preparing for the
summit, the PRC desired to have a “fourth communique” with further U.S. assurances on
Taiwan.  Also, Mann wrote that the PRC wanted the joint statement to make public the
“Three Noes” that President Clinton had promised President Jiang in a private letter in 1995.
The Joint Statement did not mention the TRA.
cross-strait exchanges.  Ultimately, the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan
is for the Chinese themselves to determine — peacefully.137
First of all, I think the most important thing the United States can do to
facilitate a peaceful resolution of the differences is to adhere strictly to the one China
policy we have agreed on, to make it clear that within the context of that one China
policy, as articulated in the communiques and our own laws, we will maintain
friendly, open relations with the people of Taiwan and China; but that we understand
that this issue has to be resolved and resolved peacefully, and that if it is resolved in
a satisfactory way, consistent with statements made in the past, then Asia will be
stronger and more stable and more prosperous.  That is good for the United States.
And our own relations with China will move on to another stage of success.  I think
the more we can encourage that, the better off we are.  But I think in the end, since
so much investment and contact has gone on in the last few years between Taiwan
and China, I think the Chinese people know how to resolve this when the time is
right, and we just have to keep saying we hope the time will be right as soon as
possible.  Sooner is better than later.138
1997 Clinton-Jiang Summit and U.S.-China Joint Statement.139
October 29, 1997
China stresses that the Taiwan question is the most important and sensitive
central question in China-U.S. relations, and that the proper handling of this
question in strict compliance with the principles set forth in the three China-U.S.
joint communiques holds the key to sound and stable growth of China-U.S. relations.
The United States reiterates that it adheres to its “one China” policy and the
principles set forth in the three U.S.-China joint communiques.
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140 Department of State, Press Briefing by James Rubin, October 31, 1997.  For the first
time, the Administration publicly stated the “Three Noes,” which were not put in writing in
the U.S.-China Joint Statement.  Rubin made that statement in response to a question about
specific assurances on Taiwan that President Clinton gave to President Jiang during the
1997 summit.  Clinton reportedly had passed a secret letter to Jiang in August 1995 with an
earlier version of the “Three Noes.”
141 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Availability by President Clinton and
President Jiang,” Beijing, PRC, June 27, 1998.
1997 Summit and the State Department on the “Three Noes”.140
October 31, 1997
We certainly made clear that we have a one-China policy; that we don’t support
a one-China, one-Taiwan policy.  We don’t support a two-China policy.  We don’t
support Taiwan independence, and we don’t support Taiwanese membership in
organizations that require you to be a member state.  We certainly made that very
clear to the Chinese.
1998 Clinton-Jiang Summit in Beijing.141
June 27, 1998
President Jiang: The Taiwan question is the most important and the most
sensitive issue at the core of China-U.S. relations.  We hope that the U.S. side will
adhere to the principles set forth in the three China-U.S. joint communiques and the
joint China-U.S. statement, as well as the relevant commitments it has made in the
interest of a smooth growth of China-U.S. relations.
President Clinton: I reaffirmed our longstanding one China policy to President
Jiang and urged the pursuit of cross-strait discussions recently resumed as the best
path to a peaceful resolution.  In a similar vein, I urged President Jiang to assume
a dialogue with the Dalai Lama in return for the recognition that Tibet is a part of
China and in recognition of the unique cultural and religious heritage of that region.
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in Discussion on Shaping China for the 21st Century,” Shanghai, China, June 30, 1998.  The
Administration maintains that the “Three Noes” represented no change in U.S. policy.
Nonetheless, President Clinton chose to issue this statement verbally and at an informal
“roundtable discussion,” rather than at the summit in Beijing with President Jiang on June
27, 1998.  In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 25, 1999,
Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth cited Kissinger’s 1971 promise as the origins of
U.S. policy of non-support for Taiwan’s independence and argued that President Clinton’s
June 1998 “Three Noes” statement represented no change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
143 On the eve of President Clinton’s trip to China, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Susan Shirk testified before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific on May 20, 1998, stating that “there will be no fourth communique; nor will our
relationship with Taiwan be diluted or sacrificed in any way.”  Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Kurt Campbell also assured Congress that “there will be no fourth communique
and there will be no document that harms Taiwan’s interest.”  The House, on June 9, 1998,
passed (411-0) H.Con.Res. 270 (Solomon), resolving that it is the sense of Congress that
“the United States abides by all previous understandings of a ‘one China’ policy and its
abiding interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue.”  The House also
resolved that the President should seek at the summit a public renunciation by the PRC of
any use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan.  After the President stated the “Three
Noes” in China, the Senate passed (92-0) S.Con.Res. 107 (Lott) on July 10, 1998, affirming
its expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, but did not
include language on the people of both sides of the strait determining their own future.  The
House, on July 20, 1998, passed (390-1) H.Con.Res. 301 (DeLay) affirming its expectation
that the “future status of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that the people
of both sides of the Taiwan Strait should determine their own future...”  Also see CRS
Report 98-837, Taiwan: the “Three No’s,” Congressional-Administration Differences, and
U.S. Policy Issues, October 1, 1998, by Robert Sutter.
144 Lee Teng-hui, “U.S. Can’t Ignore Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1998.
1998 Summit and Clinton’s Statement on the “Three Noes”.142
June 30, 1998143
I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t support
independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China.  And we don’t
believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is
a requirement.  So I think we have a consistent policy.  Our only policy has been that
we think it has to be done peacefully.  That is what our law says, and we have
encouraged the cross-strait dialogue.  And I think eventually it will bear fruit if
everyone is patient and works hard.
Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui on “One Divided China”.144
August 3, 1998
The path to a democratic China must begin with a recognition of the present
reality by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  And that reality is that China is divided,
just as Germany and Vietnam were in the past and as Korea is today.  Hence, there
is no “one China” now.  We hope for this outcome in the future, but presently it does
not exist.  Today, there is only “one divided China,” with Taiwan and the mainland
each being part of China.  Because neither has jurisdiction over the other, neither
can represent the other, much less all of China.
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145 ARATS and SEF agreed on a four-point common understanding: (hold all kinds of
dialogue, including political and economic dialogue; strengthen exchanges, including those
at all levels; strengthen mutual assistance in cases involving lives and property; acceptance
of an invitation for Wang Daohan to visit Taiwan at an appropriate time), according to
Xinhua Hong Kong Service, October 15, 1998, in FBIS.
146 Koo Chen-fu, “Key Points From Remarks Made at a Meeting with ARATS Chairman
Wang Daohan,” Shanghai, October 14, 1998 (issued by SEF, Republic of China).
147 Opening remarks of Taiwan’s SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu at a press conference after his
meeting with PRC President Jiang Zemin in Beijing, October 18, 1998.
148 Statement of Tang Shubei, executive vice chairman of the PRC’s ARATS, denying
inconsistency between comments of ARATS chairman Wang Daohan and Vice Premier
Qian Qichen, “Tang Shubei Explains ‘One China’ Principle,” Zhongguo Xinwen She (China
News Agency), Beijing, October 18, 1998; translated in FBIS.
149 Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “The
Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty — and Beyond,” address to the Woodrow Wilson Center
and the American Institute in Taiwan, Washington, DC, March 24, 1999.  On the next day,
Roth testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S.-Taiwan relations, but
he did not discuss the possibility of cross-strait “interim agreements.”  He also assured the
committee that “the future of cross-strait relations is a matter for Beijing and Taipei to
resolve.  No Administration has taken a position on how or when they should do so.”
Second “Koo-Wang Talks” (Shanghai).145
October 14, 1998
Taiwan:  It has been nearly 50 years since the two sides of the Taiwan Strait
became two equal entities under divided rule and not subordinate to each other.  A
“divided China” is not only a historical fact, but also a political reality.146
Taiwan:  China’s unification hinges upon the democratization of the Chinese
mainland.  Only when the Chinese mainland has achieved democracy can the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait talk about unification.147
PRC:  Mr. Wang said that Taiwan’s political status can be discussed under the
one China principle.  On this point, both Mr. Jiang Zemin and Mr. Qian Qichen had
similar comments to the effect that anything can be put on the table under the one
China principle.  Therefore, on the question of one China, this will be our consistent
stand before the two sides across the strait are reunified: there is only one China
across the strait, Taiwan is part of China, and Chinese sovereignty and territorial
integrity are indivisible. ...   Now, the Government of the People’s Republic of China
is universally acknowledged internationally as the only legitimate government
representing China.  In spite of this, the two sides should still negotiate on equal
footing under the principle that there is but one China.  The issue of whether the
talks are between central or local authorities can be left aside.148
U.S. Assistant Secretary Stan Roth on “Interim Agreements”.149
March 24, 1999
Insisting on peaceful resolution of differences between the PRC and Taiwan will
remain U.S. policy in the future just as surely as it has been our policy over the past
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150 President Lee Teng-hui’s interview with the Voice of Germany, Taipei, July 9, 1999,
reported in Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, July 10, 1999, in FBIS.  Lee was responding to a question
about Beijing viewing Taiwan as a “renegade province.”  Some observers note that Lee may
have specifically chosen German media, because Germany was once a divided country.
151 Three days later, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi added that “While
we continue to show our goodwill, Mainland China continues to tighten its ‘one China
principle.’  Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to stick to our previous position.  We shall
clearly define equal footing in order to usher in better cross-strait relations toward the next
century.”  From: “MAC Chairman Su Chi at July 12, 1999 Press Conference,” Taipei Speaks
Up: Special State-to-State Relationship, Republic of China’s Policy Documents, Mainland
Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, August 1999.
twenty years.  Our belief, which we have stated repeatedly, is that dialogue between
the PRC and Taiwan fosters an atmosphere in which tensions are reduced,
misperceptions can be clarified, and common ground can be explored.  The exchange
of visits under the SEF/ARATS framework, currently rich in symbolism but still
nascent in substance, has the potential to contribute to the peaceful resolution of
difficult substantive differences.
Clearly, this will not be easy, but this Administration has great confidence in
the creativity of the people of Taiwan and the people of the mainland, working
together, to identify the necessary human contacts and the most comfortable
processes to give the dialogue real meaning.  Using a phrase that has garnered much
favor in Washington of late, I could imagine that “out of the box” thinking within
this dialogue might contribute to interim agreements, perhaps in combination with
specific confidence building measures, on any number of difficult topics.  But, as the
U.S. has steadfastly held, we will avoid interfering as the two sides pursue peaceful
resolution of differences, because it is only the participants on both sides of the strait
that can craft the specific solutions which balance their interests while addressing
their most pressing concerns.
Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui on “Special State-to-State” Relations.150
July 9, 1999151
The fact that disregarding the reality that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are
under separate administrations of different governments, the Chinese communist
authorities have been threatening us with force is actually the main reason why
cross-strait ties cannot be improved thoroughly. ...  Since the PRC’s establishment,
the Chinese communists have never ruled Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,
which have been under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China. ...  Since our
constitutional reform in 1991, we have designated cross-strait ties as nation-to-
nation, or at least as special state-to-state ties, rather than internal ties within “one
China” between a legitimate government and a rebellion group, or between central
and local governments. ...
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152 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Conference by the President,”
Washington, DC, July 21, 1999.
153 “Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The Republic of China’s Position on the ‘Special
State-to-State Relationship’,” Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of
China, August 1, 1999.
President Clinton on the “Three Pillars” of Policy Toward Taiwan.152
July 21, 1999
Clinton [on whether the United States is obligated to defend Taiwan militarily
if it abandons the one China policy and would continue to provide military aid if
Taiwan pursues separatism]: Well, let me say first of all, a lot of those questions are
governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, which we intend to honor.  Our policy is
clear: We favor the one China policy; we favor the cross-strait dialogues.  The
understanding we have had all along with both China and Taiwan is that the
differences between them would be resolved peacefully.  If that were not to be the
case, under the Taiwan Relations Act we would be required to view it with the
gravest concern. ...
Clinton [on delaying a Pentagon delegation’s visit to Taiwan]: I didn’t think this
was the best time to do something which might excite either one side or the other and
imply that a military solution is an acceptable alternative.  If you really think about
what’s at stake here, it would be unthinkable.  And I want — I don’t want to depart
from any of the three pillars.  I think we need to stay with one China; I think we need
to stay with the dialogue; and I think that no one should contemplate force here.
Taiwan’s Position Paper on “Special State-to-State Relationship”.153
August 1, 1999
President Lee’s remarks concerning the nature of the cross-strait relationship
were based on the necessity of protecting national interests and dignity.  From the
political, historical, and legal perspectives, he merely clarified an existing fact.  He
by no means twisted or exaggerated the truth, nor did he exclude the goal of unifying
both sides of the Strait as a new, democratic China. ...
Taiwan and the Chinese mainland have always differed in their definition of
“one China.”  Thus, in 1992, ... the two sides eventually reached an agreement on
“one China, with each side being entitled to its respective interpretation.” ...
However, Beijing has unilaterally abandoned this agreement in recent years. ...  In
the framework of the 1992 agreement, whereby each side is entitled to its respective
interpretation, we have always maintained that the “one China” concept refers to
the future rather than the present.  The two sides are not yet unified, but are equals,
ruled separately.  We both exist concurrently.  Therefore, the two sides can be
defined as sharing a “special state-to-state relationship,” prior to unification. ...
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154 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President and President
Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China in Photo Opportunity,” Auckland, New
Zealand, September 11, 1999.  In a press briefing just after President Clinton’s meeting with
Jiang, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger said that Clinton told Jiang that if he were
to resort to military force, “there would be grave consequences in the United States.”  Berger
said Clinton also stated that U.S. policy would continue “as it has been since the presidency
of Richard Nixon,” to be based on the “three fundamental pillars” of the one China policy,
a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and the cross-strait dialogue.
155 A few days, later, on September 15, 1999, the United States spoke out, for the first time,
against the ROC’s bid for re-entering the United Nations, reported Reuters.  Previously, the
United States remained outside the debate on whether to place the issue of the ROC’s
membership on the General Assembly’s agenda.  This year, an unnamed U.S. official was
quoted: “we wanted to make clear that our ‘one-China’ policy is unchanged.”  The annual
outcome, since Taiwan’s effort began in 1993, has been a failure to get the issue of its
membership on the agenda.
Presidents Clinton and Jiang at APEC Meeting.154
September 11, 1999155
Clinton [on his message concerning Taiwan]: My message is that our policy has
not and will not change.  We favor one China.  We favor a peaceful approach to
working out the differences.  We favor the cross-strait dialogue.  Our policy has not
changed and it will not change.
Jiang [on whether the PRC will maintain its threat to use military force against
Taiwan]: Our policy on Taiwan is a consistent one.  That is, one, peaceful
unification, one country-two systems.  However, if there were to be any foreign
intervention, or if there were to be Taiwan independence, then we would not
undertake to renounce the use of force.
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156 The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council, “The One
China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” February 21, 2000, the English version as published
by Xinhua [New China News Agency] and translated in FBIS, and the Chinese version as
published by People’s Daily Online. 
157 The PRC issued this white paper just after a U.S. delegation left Beijing.  The delegation
included Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg, Under Secretary of Defense
Walter Slocombe, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston, and
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who were given no indication that the white paper
would be issued.  The white paper was also issued on the eve of Taiwan’s presidential
election scheduled for March 18, 2000, with the possibility that Chen Shui-bian would win.
Moreover, the House had passed (341-70) H.R. 1838, “the Taiwan Security Enhancement
Act,” on February 1, 2000, which was still pending in the Senate and opposed by Beijing
and the Clinton Administration.  News reports also said that Taipei and Washington were
discussing Taiwan’s possible procurement of Aegis-equipped destroyers, missile defense
systems, and other advanced U.S. weapons, leading to annual arms sales talks in April.  In
his response to the PRC’s White Paper on Taiwan, Undersecretary of Defense Walter
Slocombe, who just returned from Beijing, warned on February 22 that the PRC would face
“incalculable consequences” if it used force against Taiwan as the White Paper threatened
(Washington Post, February 23, 2000).  On the same day, Assistant Secretary of State
Stanley Roth testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and
Pacific Affairs that “the threat of the use of force to resolve the Taiwan question is contrary
to the commitments contained in the communiques that are the bedrock of U.S. policy.”  In
his comments about the White Paper, Roth also reiterated the Administration’s “three
principles” (peaceful resolution, cross-strait dialogue, and one China).
PRC’s Second Taiwan White Paper and “Three Ifs”.156
February 21, 2000157
On October 1, 1949, the Central People’s Government of the PRC was
proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become the only
legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the
international arena, thereby bringing the historical status of the Republic of China
to an end. ...  so the government of the PRC naturally should fully enjoy and exercise
China’s sovereignty, including its sovereignty over Taiwan. ...
The Chinese government is actively and sincerely striving for peaceful
unification.  To achieve peaceful unification, the Chinese government has appealed
time and again for cross-strait negotiations on the basis of equality and the One
China principle. ...  The Chinese government has also proposed that dialogue (that
includes political dialogue) may start first, which may gradually move on to
procedural consultations for political negotiation (to resolve issues for formal
negotiation, such as the name, topics for discussion, and format), then political
negotiation may begin.  Political negotiation may be carried out step-by-step. ...
However, since the early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui has gradually deviated from the
One China principle...  In military affairs, the Taiwan authorities have bought large
quantities of advanced weapons from foreign countries and sought to join the TMD
system, attempting to covertly establish certain forms of military alliance with the
United States and Japan. ...
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158 This second phrase can be interpreted to mean U.S. involvement in Taiwan’s defense.
159 Remarks by the President to the Business Council, February 24, 2000.  Later, Clinton
added a third point, saying also that “there must be a shift from threat to dialogue across the
Taiwan Strait, and we will continue to encourage both sides to seize this opportunity after
the Taiwan election” (Remarks by the President on China, March 8, 2000). 
160 ROC, Office of the President, “Taiwan Stands Up: Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era,”
May 20, 2000 (English and Chinese versions via the Government Information Office).
161 On March 18, 2000, Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the
presidential election in Taiwan with 39 percent of the vote.  Independent candidate James
Soong won 37 percent.  The ruling Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party’s, Lien Chan
won 23 percent.  The DPP has leaned toward favoring Taiwan’s independence.  Chen’s DPP
administration brought Taiwan’s first democratic transfer of power from one party to
another, after 55 years of KMT rule.
Facts prove that a serious crisis still exists in the situation of the Taiwan Strait.
To safeguard the interests of the entire Chinese people, including compatriots in
Taiwan, and maintain the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region, the
Chinese government remains firm in adhering to “peaceful unification, one
country/two systems;” upholding the eight propositions put forward by President
Jiang Zemin for the development of cross-strait relations and the acceleration of the
peaceful unification of China; and doing its utmost to achieve the objective of
peaceful unification.  However, if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the
separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if there is foreign invasion and
occupation of Taiwan,158 or if Taiwan authorities indefinitely refuse to peacefully
resolve the cross-strait unification problem through negotiations, then the Chinese
government will only be forced to adopt all possible drastic measures, including the
use of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and fulfill the
great cause of China’s unification. ...
Countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China must not sell arms to
Taiwan or enter into any forms of military alliance with Taiwan ... or help Taiwan
to produce weapons. ...
President Clinton on Resolution with Assent of Taiwan’s People.159
February 24, 2000
We’ll continue to reject the use of force as a means to resolve the Taiwan
question.  We’ll also continue to make absolutely clear that the issues between
Beijing and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of
Taiwan.
Taiwan President Chen’s Inauguration Speech and “Five Noes”.160
May 20, 2000161
Today, as the Cold War has ended, it is time for the two sides to cast aside the
hostilities left from the old era.  We do not need to wait further because now is a new
opportunity for the two sides to create an era of reconciliation together.
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162 Xinhua [New China News Agency], August 25, 2000, in FBIS.
163 In July 2000, while meeting with visiting Taiwan lawmakers and journalists, Qian Qichen
began to articulate this more flexible formulation of the “one China” principle, particularly
in saying that the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China (vs. that Taiwan is a part
of the PRC or China), according to Taiwan media (e.g., Central News Agency, July 18,
2000).  Later, looking towards an incoming Bush Administration, Qian granted an interview
at Zhongnanhai (the leadership compound) to the Washington Post to reiterate what he
described as a new flexibility on Taiwan to the United States (John Pomfret, “Beijing
Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan,” Washington Post, January 5, 2001).  In a speech on
January 11, 2001, outgoing Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth praised the “significant
formulation by Vice Premier Qian Qichen to the effect that the PRC and Taiwan are both
parts of China.”  In an interview with the Washington Post (March 24, 2001), however,
President Jiang Zemin ruled out applying the models of confederation or federation.
164 Chen Shui-bian, President of the Republic of China, “Bridging the New Century: New
Year’s Eve Address,” December 31, 2000.  For “integration,” Chen used “tong he.”
The people across the Taiwan Strait share the same ancestral, cultural, and
historical background.  While upholding the principles of democracy and parity,
building upon the existing foundations, and constructing conditions for cooperation
through goodwill, we believe that the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom
and creativity to jointly deal with the question of a future “one China.”
I fully understand that as the popularly elected 10th-term President of the
Republic of China, I must abide by the Constitution, maintain the sovereignty,
dignity, and security of our country, and ensure the well-being of all citizens.
Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against
Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will
not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called
“state-to-state” description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum
to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification.
Furthermore, the abolition of the National Unification Council or the Guidelines for
National Unification will not be an issue.
PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s New Formulation.162
July-August 2000163
With regard to cross-strait relations, the one China principle we stand for is
that there is only one China in the world; the mainland and Taiwan all belong to one
China; and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible.
Taiwan President Chen on “Integration”.164
December 31, 2000
I have always felt that the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait came from
the same family and that they all pursue the same goals of peaceful coexistence and
mutual prosperity.  Since both sides with to live under the same roof, we should be
more understanding and helpful rather than harming or destroying each other. ...
The integration of our economies, trade, and culture can be a starting point for
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165 President’s interview on ABC’s “Good Morning America” program, April 25, 2001;
followed by interview on “CNN Inside Politics,” April 25, 2001.  The interviews took place
one day after the annual arms sales talks with Taiwan authorities in Washington.
Elaborating on the President’s statements, Vice President Dick Cheney said that “the kind
of diplomatic ambiguity people talk about may be OK in diplomacy sometimes.  But when
we get into an area where one side is displaying increasingly aggressive posture, if you will,
toward the other, then it’s appropriate to clarify here that in fact we’re serious about this.
It is an important step for the United States, and we don’t want to see a misjudgment on the
part of the Chinese” (interview on “Fox News Sunday,” April 29, 2001).
gradually building faith and confidence in each other.  This, in turn, can be the basis
for a new framework of permanent peace and political integration.
Statements During George W. Bush Administration
President Bush on “Whatever It Takes”.165
April 25, 2001
On ABC: [If Taiwan were attacked by the PRC, the United States has an
obligation to use] whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.
On CNN: Well, I think that the Chinese must hear that ours is an
administration, like other administrations, that is willing to uphold the spirit of the
... Taiwan Relations Act.  And I’ll do so.  However, I think it’s important for people
to also note that mine is an administration that strongly supports the one China
policy, that we expect any dispute to be resolved peacefully.  And that’s the message
I really want people to hear.  But as people have seen, that I’m willing to help
Taiwan defend herself, and that nothing has really changed in policy, as far as I’m
concerned.  This is what other presidents have said, and I will continue to say so. ...
I have said that I will do what it takes to help Taiwan defend herself, and the Chinese
must understand that.  Secondly, I certainly hope Taiwan adheres to the one China
policy.  And a declaration of independence is not the one China policy, and we will
work with Taiwan to make sure that that doesn’t happen.  We need a peaceful
resolution of this issue.
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166 The adjustment in PRC policy came after Taiwan’s elections on December 1, 2001, in
which the DPP made significant gains in the legislature.  The DPP won 87 seats, compared
with the KMT’s 68 seats, the People First Party (PFP)’s 46 seats, the Taiwan Solidarity
Union (TSU)’s 13 seats, and the New Party’s 1 seat.  Independents make up the other 10
seats of the 225-seat Legislative Yuan.  Also, the speech was given as the United States and
the PRC prepared for President Bush’s visit to Beijing on February 21-22, 2002.
167 People’s Daily (in Chinese and English) and Xinhua as translated by FBIS.  The occasion
for Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s speech was the 7th anniversary of Jiang Zemin’s “Eight
Points.”  Also, the People’s Daily published a related editorial on January 25, 2002.
168 While saying that its fundamental policy was unchanged, the PRC signaled a new
receptive policy toward the ruling DPP and a change in tone (without reiterating the threat
to use force).  But, a week later, a spokesman for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhang
Mingqing,  excluded Chen Shui-bian and his vice president, Annette Lu, from the invitation
to visit.  While visiting Taiwan at about the same time, the Chairman and Managing Director
of AIT, Richard Bush, spoke on January 28, 2002, saying that “it does not seem constructive
for one side to set pre-conditions for a resumption of dialogue that the other side even
suspects would be tantamount to conceding a fundamental issue before discussion begins.”
169 White House, “President Bush Meets with Chinese President Jiang Zemin,” Great Hall
of the People, Beijing, February 21, 2002.  The visit to China was the President’s second in
four months, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice said that, in his meeting with Jiang, Bush restated the U.S. policy on
Taiwan as a consistent policy and said that he hoped for a peaceful resolution and no
provocations by either side, and that the United States will live up to the TRA.  Bush also
talked with students at Tsinghua University on February 22, and he explicitly mentioned the
“one China policy” as one he has not changed.  Nonetheless, Bush emphasized the U.S.
defense commitment in the TRA and warned both Beijing and Taipei against provocations.
PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s Invitation to the DPP.166
January 24, 2002167
The refusal to accept the principle of one China and recognize the “1992
consensus” by the leader of the Taiwan authorities is the crucial reason leading to
a deadlock in cross-strait relations and also the root cause of instability of the
situation and possible danger in the Taiwan Strait.  ...  We hold that political
differences must not interfere with economic and trade exchanges between the two
sides of the strait.  ... We are willing to hear opinions from people in Taiwan on the
establishment of a mechanism for economic cooperation and the promotion of
economic relations between the two sides. ...  The Democratic Progressive Party
should think more about the welfare of the people in Taiwan, thoroughly discard its
“Taiwan independence party platform,” and develop cross-strait relations with a
sincere attitude.  We believe that the broad masses of the DPP are different from the
minority of stubborn “Taiwan independence” elements.  We welcome them to come,
in appropriate capacities, to sightsee, visit, and increase their understanding.168
Bush-Jiang Press Conference in Beijing.169
February 21, 2002
Jiang: President Bush emphasized that the United States upholds the one China
policy and will abide by the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques.
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170 Office of the President of the Republic of China, “Chen Shui-bian’s Opening Address to
the 29th Annual Meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations (in Tokyo,
Japan) via Live Video Link,” Chinese version (basis of the translation here) issued on
August 3, and English version issued on August 7, 2002.  Chen’s remarks raised questions
about whether he was changing policy to seek an independent Taiwan, whether there was
coordination within his government, whether the speech would provoke tensions in the
Taiwan Strait, and whether U.S. policy needed adjustment.  On August 4, 2002, the NSC
spokesman responded briefly that U.S. policy has not changed, and added on August 7, that
“we have a one-China policy, and we do not support Taiwan independence” and that the
United States “calls on all parties to avoid steps with might threaten cross-strait peace and
stability, and urges a resumption of dialogue between Beijing and Taiwan.”  On August 8,
the Chairwoman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, Tsai Ing-wen, visited Washington
to tell the Administration and Congress that Taiwan’s policy on cross-strait relations has not
changed, remaining consistent with Chen’s inauguration address.  While in Beijing on
August 26, 2002, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage responded to a question about
Chen’s speech, saying that “the United States does not support Taiwan independence.”  He
later explained that “by saying we do not support, it’s one thing.  It’s different from saying
we oppose it.  If people on both sides of the strait came to an agreeable solution, then the
United States obviously wouldn’t inject ourselves.  Hence, we use the term we don’t
‘support’ it.  But it’s something to be resolved by the people on both sides of the question.”
Bush:  As [President Jiang] mentioned, we talked about Taiwan.  The position
of my government has not changed over the years.  We believe in the peaceful
settlement of this issue.  We will urge there be no provocation.  The United States
will continue to support the Taiwan Relations Act.
Taiwan President Chen on “One Country on Each Side”.170
August 3, 2002
I would like to take a moment here to make a  few calls for your consideration:
(1) During these past few days, I have said that we must seriously consider going
down Taiwan’s own road. ...  What does “Taiwan’s own road” mean? ...  Taiwan’s
own road is Taiwan’s road of democracy, Taiwan’s road of freedom, Taiwan’s road
of human rights, and Taiwan’s road of peace.  
(2) Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied, diminished,
marginalized, or downgraded as a local entity.  Taiwan does not belong to someone
else, nor is it someone else’s local government or province.  Taiwan also cannot
become a second Hong Kong or Macau, because Taiwan is a sovereign independent
country.  Simply put, it must be clear that Taiwan and China are each one country
on each side [yibian yiguo] of the strait.  
(3) China has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan and continues
to suppress Taiwan in the  international community. ...  China’s so-called “one
China principle” or “one country, two systems” would change Taiwan’s status quo.
We cannot accept this, because whether Taiwan’s future or status quo should be
changed cannot be decided for us by any one country, any one government, any one
political party, or any one person.  Only the 23 million great people of Taiwan have
the right to decide Taiwan’s future, fate, and status. If the need arises, how should
this decision be made?  It is our long-sought ideal and goal, and our common idea:
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171 White House, “Remarks by the President and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Press
Conference,” Bush Ranch, Crawford, TX, October 25, 2002.  This summit was the third
meeting between the two presidents.
172 In contrast, PRC media reported that President Bush expressed to Jiang that the United
States “opposes” (fandui) Taiwan independence.  See “During Talks with Jiang Zemin,
Bush Explicitly States for the First time ‘Opposition to Taiwan Independence’,” Zhongguo
Xinwen She, October 26, 2002; People’s Daily editorial (considered authoritative statement
of PRC leadership views), “New Century, New Situation, New Actions,” October 30, 2002.
When asked about Bush’s comments to Jiang, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly
maintained, at a November 19, 2002 press briefing, that “there has been no change in
American policy and there was no change in the meeting or out of the meeting with respect
to our position on Taiwan.”  Still, in a meeting with Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman of the
House International Relations Committee in Beijing on December 10, 2002, Jiang said he
appreciated President Bush’s “opposition” (fandui in Chinese version) to Taiwan
independence, according to People’s Daily.  PRC experts on U.S.-China relations have
reported since the meeting that Bush said that he is “against” Taiwan independence.
173 As confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen, and
reported in Taiwan’s media (Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], November 22, 2002),
President Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in China’s deployment
of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraints in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
President Bush reportedly did not respond to Jiang’s linkage.
a referendum. ...  I sincerely call upon and encourage everyone to seriously consider
the importance and urgency of legislation for holding referendums.
Bush-Jiang Summit in Crawford, Texas.171
October 25, 2002
Bush: On Taiwan, I emphasized to the President that our one China policy,
based on the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, remains unchanged.
I stressed the need for dialogue between China and Taiwan that leads to a peaceful
resolution of their differences. ...  The one China policy means that the issue ought
to be resolved peacefully.  We’ve got influence with some in the region; we intend to
make sure that the issue is resolved peacefully and that includes making it clear that
we do not support independence.172
Jiang: We have had a frank exchange of views on the Taiwan question, which
is of concern to the Chinese side.  I have elaborated my government’s basic policy
of peaceful unification and one country, two systems, for the settlement of the Taiwan
question.  President Bush has reiterated his clear-cut position, that the U.S.
government abides by the one China policy.173
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174 After the PRC blocked Taiwan’s efforts to participate in the World Health Organization
(WHO) in May 2003, despite the SARS epidemic, President Chen Shui-bian announced in
a May 20, 2003 speech to the DPP, that he would promote a referendum on whether Taiwan
should join the WHO.  He called for that referendum and one on construction of a nuclear
power plant to coincide with the presidential election in March 2004.
175 In a background briefing released by the White House on June 1, 2003, an unnamed
senior administration official volunteered to reporters this version of Bush’s discussions on
Taiwan in his first meeting with Hu Jintao after he became PRC president, in Evian, France.
176 People’s Daily, June 2, 2003.  The official report in Chinese used fandui (oppose).
177 On September 22-23, 2003, PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Washington and
met with President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld.  Li reportedly complained about U.S. handling of the Taiwan issue.
178 Central News Agency, Taipei, September 28, 2003; Taipei Times, September 29, 2003;
World Journal, New York, September 30, 2003.  Leading up to the next presidential election
in March 2004, Chen Shui-bian announced a goal of enacting a new constitution for the
people of Taiwan in time for the 20th anniversary of the founding of the DPP on September
28, 2006.  Chen elaborated on his proposal in a speech on September 30, 2003, at a meeting
of the Central Standing Committee of the DPP (translated from Chinese text).  In response,
on September 29, 2003, the State Department’s spokesman called Chen’s announcement an
“individual campaign statement” and declined to take a position on Taiwan’s domestic
politics.  Nonetheless, the U.S. response stressed “stability in the Taiwan Strait” and
reminded Chen of his pledges in his inauguration speech of May 2000, saying that the
United States “take them seriously and believe they should be adhered to.”
Bush’s Meeting with PRC President Hu Jintao in France.
June 1, 2003 174
U.S.:  On Taiwan, the President repeated our policy of a one-China policy,
based on the three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, no support for Taiwan
independence.  The Chinese basically accepted that, and said, okay, that’s positive.
They did say that they have concerns about forces on Taiwan moving towards
independence.  The President said, we don’t support independence.175
PRC:  President Hu reiterated China’s principled stand on the Taiwan issue.
...  Bush said that the U.S. government will continue to follow the “one China”
policy, abide by the three U.S.-China joint communiques, oppose “Taiwan
independence,” and that this policy has not changed and will not change.176
President Chen Shui-bian on a New Constitution.177
September 28, 2003178
If we consider the 1996 direct presidential election as the most significant
symbol of Taiwan becoming a sovereign, democratic country, then, in 2006, this
“complete” country will be 10 years old.  Going through 10 years of practical
experience, we must consider what we should seek next as a sovereign, democratic
country.  I must say that, in the next phase, we should further seek the deepening of
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179 On November 11, 2003, Chen Shui-bian also issued a timetable: a new draft constitution
by September 28, 2006; a referendum on the constitution on December 10, 2006; and
enactment of the new constitution on May 20, 2008.
180 In briefing the press on President Bush’s trip to Asia, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice said on October 14, 2003, that “nobody should try unilaterally to change
the status quo...  There must be a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue,” in response
to a question about Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s statements regarding “one country
on each side” of the Taiwan Strait.
181 White House, “Remarks by President Bush and President Hu Jintao of China,” Bangkok,
Thailand, October 19, 2003.  In making their joint public appearance, President Bush did
not address the U.S. position on the Taiwan issue and did not correct President Hu’s
characterization of the U.S. position, including “opposition” to Taiwan independence.  On
October 20, 2003, People’s Daily gave the PRC’s official version of the meeting, reporting
that Bush told Hu that the U.S. government upholds the one China policy, abides by the
three communiques, and “opposes” (fandui) Taiwan independence, and that this policy will
not change.  An unnamed senior administration official briefed the press on the U.S. version
of the meeting, according to a White House press release on October 19, 2003.  When asked
about Hu Jintao’s characterization of Bush’s “opposition” to Taiwan independence, the U.S.
official  said that U.S. policy on “one China” has not changed and that “we don’t support
Taiwan moving toward independence.”  When asked whether Hu Jintao misrepresented the
U.S. view, the U.S. official replied, “I don’t know” and reiterated Rice’s message as one of
not wanting either party to change the status quo unilaterally in the Taiwan Strait in a way
that would upset peace and stability.  “We’re trying to make that clear,” the official said.
democracy and a more efficient constitutional system, in order to lead Taiwan’s
people to face the rigorous challenges of the new century.179
Bush’s Meeting with Hu Jintao in Thailand.180
October 19, 2003181
Bush: President Hu and I have had a very constructive dialogue. ...
Hu:  President Bush reiterated his government’s position of adhering to the one
China policy, the three China-U.S. joint communiques, and his opposition to Taiwan
independence.  
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182 Central News Agency, Taipei, “Taiwan Never Slows Its Pace of Human Rights Reform:
President,” October 31, 2003.  The United States allowed Chen Shui-bian to transit through
New York on his way to Panama.  While in New York, Chen received an award from the
International League for Human Rights and gave this speech.  At the Heritage Foundation,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver told reporters that the Administration
“appreciated” Chen’s reiteration of his pledges in the inauguration speech of 2000 and that
the transit “went very well.” (Central News Agency, November 3, 2003).  He also said that
the Administration supported Chen’s attendance at the “private event” and received an
advance copy of Chen’s speech “as a courtesy” (Taipei Times, November 5, 2003).
183 On the same day, Chen Ming-tong, a vice chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs
Council (MAC), gave a speech at the 2nd World Convention of the Global Alliance for
Democracy and Peace held in Houston, TX.  He contended that Taiwan is already a
sovereign, democratic country that is in a “post-independence period” and that the proposals
for referendums and a new constitution are not meant to declare independence.  He also said
that Chen Shui-bian instructed Lee Yuan-tse, Taiwan’s envoy to the APEC summit in
Thailand in October 2003, to tell President Bush that the referendums have nothing to do
with promoting Taiwan’s independence.
184 On November 27, 2003, Taiwan’s legislature passed legislation favored by the opposition
parties (KMT and PFP) governing referendums while excluding a DPP proposal for
referendums on the national name, flag, and other sovereignty issues.  The law did authorize
the president to hold a referendum on national security issues if Taiwan’s sovereignty faced
an external threat.  President Chen then announced on November 29 that he would indeed
hold a “defensive referendum” on the day of the election, on March 20, 2004.   
185 State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, press briefing, December 1, 2003.
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated on October 14, 2003, that “nobody
should try unilaterally to change the status quo,” but this was the first time the Bush
Administration publicly stated “opposition” to any referendum that would change Taiwan’s
status.  On the same day, the Senior Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security
Council, James Moriarty, secretly met with President Chen in Taiwan and expressed U.S.
concerns about “provocations,” the United Daily News reported on December 1, 2003.
Chen Shui-bian’s Speech in New York.182
October 31, 2003183
The hastening of a new Taiwan constitution will determine whether or not our
democracy can come into full bloom.  This, strengthened and supplemented by the
institutions of direct democracy, such as referendums, will be a necessary step in
advancing Taiwan’s human rights and the deepening of its democracy.  One must not
be misled by the contention that holding referendums or re-engineering our
constitutional framework bears any relevance to the “Five Noes” pledge presented
in my inaugural speech.  Neither should matters concerning Taiwan’s constitutional
development be simplistically interpreted as a political debate of unification versus
independence.
U.S. “Opposition” to Change in Taiwan’s Status.184
December 1, 2003185
We oppose any attempt by either side to unilaterally change the status quo in
the Taiwan Strait.  We also urge both sides to refrain from actions or statements that
increase tensions or make dialogue more difficult to achieve.  Therefore, we would
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186 White House, Remarks by President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao in Photo Opportunity,
the Oval Office, December 9, 2003.  Bush did not make public remarks against the PRC’s
military threats toward Taiwan.  On December 11, 2003, Representatives Brown, Chabot,
Rohrabacher, and Wexler, the four co-Chairs of the Taiwan Caucus, wrote to President
Bush, criticizing his remarks with Wen and urging him to support Taiwan’s referendums.
On March 17, 2004, 36 Members of the House, led by Representatives Peter Deutsch and
Dana Rohrabacher, signed a letter to Taiwan’s people in support of their right to hold
referendums and to self-determination.
187 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly
at hearing held by the House International Relations Committee on “The Taiwan Relations
Act: The Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004. 
be opposed to any referenda that would change Taiwan’s status or move toward
independence.  The United States has always held, and again reiterates, that cross-
strait dialogue is essential to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area.  President
Chen pledged in his inaugural address in the year 2000 not to declare independence,
not to change the name of Taiwan’s government, and not to add the “state-to-state”
theory to the constitution, and not to promote a referendum to change the status quo
on independence or unification.  We appreciate President Chen’s pledge in 2000,
and his subsequent reaffirmations of it, and we take it very seriously.
President Bush’s Meeting with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao.186
December 9, 2003
Bush [on whether Taiwan’s President should cancel the referendum planned for
March 20, 2004]:  The United States Government’s policy is one China, based upon
the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act.  We oppose any unilateral
decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo.  And the comments and
actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make
decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.
Wen: On many occasions, and just now in the meeting as well, President Bush
has reiterated the U.S. commitment to the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiques, the
one China principle, and opposition to Taiwan independence.  We appreciate that.
In particular, we very much appreciate the position adopted by President Bush
toward the latest moves and developments in Taiwan — that is, the attempt to resort
to referendums of various kinds as an excuse to pursue Taiwan independence.  We
appreciate the position of the U.S. government.
U.S. Policy Statement After Chen Shui-bian’s Re-election.187
April 21, 2004
The United States does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral
moves that would change the status quo as we define it.  For Beijing, this means no
use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan.  For Taipei, it means exercising
prudence in managing all aspects of cross-strait relations.  For both sides, it means
no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan’s status. ...
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The President’s message on December 9 of last year during PRC Premier Wen
Jiabao’s visit reiterated the U.S. Government’s opposition to any unilateral moves
by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. ... The United States will fulfill
its obligations to help Taiwan defend itself, as mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act.
At the same time, we have very real concerns that our efforts at deterring Chinese
coercion might fail if Beijing ever becomes convinced Taiwan is embarked on a
course toward independence and permanent separation from China, and concludes
that Taiwan must be stopped in these efforts. ...
The United States strongly supports Taiwan’s democracy, ... but we do not
support Taiwan independence.  A unilateral move toward independence will avail
Taiwan of nothing it does not already enjoy in terms of democratic freedom,
autonomy, prosperity, and security. ...
While strongly opposing the use of force by the PRC, we must also acknowledge
with a sober mind what the PRC leaders have repeatedly conveyed about China’s
capabilities and intentions. ...  It would be irresponsible of us and of Taiwan’s
leaders to treat these statements as empty threats. ...  We encourage the people of
Taiwan to regard this threat equally seriously.   We look to President Chen to
exercise the kind of responsible, democratic, and restrained leadership that will be
necessary to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for Taiwan. ...
As Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly and
bluntly if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely impact U.S.
security interests or have the potential to undermine Taiwan’s own security.  There
are limitations with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan
considers possible changes to its constitution. ...
Our position continues to be embodied in the so-called “Six Assurances”
offered to Taiwan by President Reagan.  We will neither seek to mediate between the
PRC and Taiwan nor will we exert pressure on Taiwan to come to the bargaining
table.  Of course, the United States is also committed to make available defensive
arms and defensive services to Taiwan in order to help Taiwan meet its self-defense
needs.  We believe a secure and self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more
capable of engaging in political interaction and dialogue with the PRC, and we
expect Taiwan will not interpret our support as a blank check to resist such dialogue.
...
War in the Strait would be a disaster for both sides and set them back decades,
and undermine everything they and others in the region have worked so hard to
achieve.  We continue to urge Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue as soon as
possible through any available channels, without preconditions. ...
The United States is committed to make available defensive arms and defensive
services to Taiwan in order to help Taiwan meet its self-defense needs. ...  The PRC
has explicitly committed itself publicly and in exchanges with the United States over
the last 25 years to a fundamental policy “to strive for a peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan question.”  If the PRC meets its obligations, and its words are matched by
a military posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to Taiwan, it
follows logically that Taiwan’s defense requirements will change. ...
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188 Presidential Office of the Republic of China, “President Chen’s Inaugural Address:
Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan,” May 20, 2004, in Chinese with English version.
189 On March 20, 2004, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP won re-election with 50.1 percent of the
votes, while Lien Chan of the KMT received 49.9 percent.  The opposition disputed the
result of the election, in which Chen won with a margin of 0.2 percent, after surviving an
assassination attempt the day before the election.  On March 26, 2004, the White House
congratulated Chen Shui-bian on his victory.  See also CRS Report RS21770, Taiwan in
2004: Elections, Referenda, and Other Democratic Challenges, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
190 While President Chen said “new constitution” in Chinese, the official English translation
used “a new version of our constitution.”
191 The speech showed Chen Shui-bian responding positively to U.S. concerns after his re-
election in March 2004 as to whether he would be pragmatic, predictable, and non-
provocative.  He did not repeat what Beijing perceives as antagonistic phrases such as “one
country on each side” or “the status quo is Taiwan as an independent state.”  Chen did not
rule out options for Taiwan’s future.  He also promised to seek constitutional changes using
the process under the existing constitution and did not reiterate his call to use a referendum
instead.  Chen promised to exclude sovereignty issues from the constitutional changes.  He
reaffirmed the commitments in his inaugural address of 2000, while not explicitly re-stating
the “Five Noes.”  The White House responded that the speech was “responsible and
constructive” and presented another opportunity to restore cross-strait dialogue.
Chen Shui-bian’s Second Inaugural Address.188
May 20, 2004189
The constitutional re-engineering project aims to enhance good governance and
increase administrative efficiency, to ensure a solid foundation for democratic rule
of law, and to foster long-term stability and prosperity of the nation. ...  By the time
I complete my presidency in 2008, I hope to hand the people of Taiwan and to our
country a new constitution190 — one that is timely, relevant, and viable — as my
historic responsibility and my commitment to the people.  In the same context, I am
fully aware that consensus has yet to be reached on issues related to national
sovereignty, territory, and the subject of unification/independence; therefore, let me
explicitly propose that these particular issues be excluded from the present
constitutional re-engineering project.  Procedurally, we shall follow the rules set out
in the existing Constitution and its amendments. ...
If both sides are willing, on the basis of goodwill, to create an environment
engendered upon “peaceful development and freedom of choice,” then in the future,
the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China — or Taiwan and China
 — can seek to establish relations in any form whatsoever.  We would not exclude
any possibility, so long as there is the consent of the 23 million people of Taiwan. ...
Today, I would like to reaffirm the promises and principles set forth in my
inaugural speech in 2000.  Those commitments have been honored.  They have not
changed over the past four years, nor will they change in the next four years. ...191
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192 Secretary of State Colin Powell, Interview with Phoenix TV, Beijing, October 25, 2004.
193 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Interview with PBS, December 10, 2004.
194 Translation of Article 8 of China’s “Anti-Secession Law,” adopted on March 14, 2005.
195 At the February 15, 2005 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
nomination of Robert Zoellick to be Deputy Secretary of State, Zoellick responded to a
question from Senator Lisa Murkowski on the Anti-Secession Law by publicly criticizing
it as an action that would run counter to a peaceful resolution and dialogue.  On March 16,
the House passed (424-4) H.Con.Res. 98 (Hyde) to express grave concern about the “Anti-
Secession Law,” and the House Taiwan Caucus hosted a briefing by Taiwan’s Ambassador
David Lee.  On April 6, 2005, the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific held a hearing on China’s “Anti-Secession Law.”
196 Despite the “Anti-Secession Law,” KMT Chairman Lien Chan flew across the strait for
a historic meeting with CPC General-Secretary Hu Jintao on April 29, 2005.
Colin Powell on Taiwan’s Lack of Sovereignty.192
October 25, 2004
There is only one China.  Taiwan is not independent.  It does not enjoy
sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy.  And it is a
policy that has allowed Taiwan to develop a very vibrant democratic system, a
market economic system, and provided great benefits to the people of Taiwan.  And
that is why we think it is a policy that should be respected and should remain in force
and will remain in force, on the American side, it is our policy that clearly rests on
the Three Communiques.  To repeat it one more time: we do not support an
independence movement in Taiwan.
Richard Armitage on the TRA and Taiwan’s Status.193
December 10, 2004
We have the requirement with the Taiwan Relations Act to keep sufficient force
in the Pacific to be able to deter attack; we are not required to defend.  And these are
questions that actually reside with the U.S. Congress, who has to declare an act of
war.  But I think we have to manage this question appropriately.  We all agree that
there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.
China’s “Anti-Secession Law”.194
March 14, 2005195
If the separatist forces of “Taiwan independence” use any name or any means
to cause the fact of Taiwan’s separation from China, or a major incident occurs that
would lead to Taiwan’s separation from China, or the possibilities of peaceful
unification are completely exhausted, the country may adopt non-peaceful means and
other necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial
integrity.196
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197 George W. Bush, Interview with Fox News, June 8, 2005.
198 Despite his “Five Noes,” on January 29, 2006, Chen Shui-bian called for consideration
of whether to “abolish” the largely symbolic National Unification Council (NUC) and
National Unification Guidelines (NUG).  President Bush sent NSC official Dennis Wilder
to Taipei with U.S. concerns.  Representatives Dana Rohrabacher and Steve Chabot wrote
a supportive commentary, “Principled Defense of Freedom,” Washington Times, February
17, 2006.  On February 27, Chen chaired a national security meeting, announcing he would
“terminate” (without saying “abolish”) the NUC and NUG.
199 Senator John Warner, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, told Admiral William
Fallon, Commander of the Pacific Command, at a committee hearing on March 7, 2006, that
“if conflict were precipitated by just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the
Taiwanese elected officials, I’m not entirely sure that this nation would come full force to
their rescue if they created that problem.”
Bush on U.S. Response to Provocations.197
June 8, 2005
If China were to invade unilaterally, we would rise up in the spirit of the
Taiwan Relations Act.  If Taiwan were to declare independence unilaterally, it would
be a unilateral decision, that would then change the U.S. equation, the U.S. look at
what the ... the decision-making process.  My attitude is, is that time will heal this
issue.  And therefore we’re trying to make sure that neither side provokes the other
through unilateral action.
Chen Terminates the National Unification Guidelines.198
February 27, 2006
The National Unification Council will cease to function.  No budget will be
earmarked for it, and its personnel must return to their original posts.  The National
Unification Guidelines will cease to apply.199
